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The term «Emerging Market» describes a country that has some characteristics of a developed 
high-income economy, such as the United States, Western Europe and Japan, but does not 
meet the standards of a fully developed economy. The Emerging Markets are in a transitional 
phase marked by rapid GDP growth towards rule of law and institutional credibility. 
Emerging Markets describe developing countries that are not among the poorest nor of the 
newly industrialized countries, but countries that have the potential to become a fully 
developed economy (Gaeta, 2012b) 
The reason that additional research on the Emerging Markets is a relevant topic is because 
there has been a change in the global economic landscape where the Emerging Markets have 
gone from being only a minor player a few decades ago to now dominating the world 
economic growth. Analysts are already talking about a new economic world order, with the 
Emerging Markets dominating the world economy in the future. This thesis look at factors 
that have made them grow in a quantitative data analysis for 25 different Emerging Markets 
as well as a case-study conducted to identify the main institutions and main drivers and 
hindrances for achieving sustainable economic growth in the three largest Emerging Markets; 
China, India and Brazil. 
A great potential for future economic growth is not a guarantee for future economic success 
and my findings support earlier research that indicate that there is a huge difference between 
their potential and the reality. It would be difficult to maintain the growth rates of the last 25 
years for many of the Emerging Markets and it will take a long time before most of them 
could be even nearly as wealthy as the countries of the developed world. A common factor for 
most Emerging Markets is that they struggle with institutional weakness on key areas like rule 
of law, governance and economic freedom. Growth and economic success is the consequence 
of decent economic framework conditions and to live up to their potential, institutional 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The term «Emerging Market» describes a country that has some characteristics of a developed 
high-income economy, but does not yet meet the standards of a fully developed market. They 
are in a transitional phase between developing and developed status, and are developing 
countries that are not among the poorest nor of the newly industrialized countries, but have 
potential to become a fully developed economy.  
Over the last decades, the global economic landscape has changed dramatically. There has 
been a transformation in the global economy where the Emerging Markets has gone from 
being only a minor player a few decades ago, to now dominating the world economic growth 
with their commercial activity, economic output and population. According to predictions 
made by PWC, 4 of the 5 largest and 9 of the 15 largest economies in the world in 2050, in 
terms of GDP, will belong to the group that we now call Emerging Markets (PWC, 2015). 
Economists are already talking about a new economic world order, where the Emerging 
Markets will dominate the world economy in the future. The greatest success story of our 
generation is of course China. Their tremendous transformation during the last 30 years 
inspires other Emerging Markets, partly backed by the fact that China became the second 
largest economy in the world in 2010; while some analysts believe China will surpass the 
United States in terms of GDP by 2030 and become the world’s largest economy (PWC, 
2015; Ward, 2012). 
However, the reason they are still called “Emerging Markets” are that they have large 
unleashed potential. Based on GDP per capita, rather than overall GDP, it will take a long 
time before most of them could be even nearly as wealthy as the countries in the developed 
world. China is projected to become not far off double the size of the United States in total 
GDP by 2050, but in GDP per capita it is projected to be just half (Ward, 2012). A common 
factor for many Emerging Markets is that they struggle with institutional weaknesses. Many 
of them are still weak in key areas such as rule of law, governance, and economic freedoms. 
Growth and economic success is the consequence of decent economic framework conditions 
and long-term sustainable economic growth is dependent on a society with a sustainable basis 
for investment and development. To live up to their potential, reforms are needed in most of 




1.2 Research Questions 
This thesis will seek to find out why some countries succeed while others do not. I will try to 
find what factors and institutions are essential for improving a countries growth environment 
and for establishing long-term economic growth. 
The following research questions are raised: 
1) Which factors are essential for improving a country’s growth environment and for 
establishing long-term economic growth? 
2) What are the main institutions of China, India and Brazil and their main drivers and 
hindrances for achieving sustainable growth? 
In addition to an analysis of 25 countries that belong to the Emerging Markets I also look 
more deeply into three of the major Emerging Markets; China, India and Brazil. What factors 
and institutions has helped them grow, what factors and institutions would help them or what 
will hinder their continued growth into a high-income economy? This thesis explores the 
connection between institutions and other vital factors and their effect on economic growth. 
1.3 Structure 
Chapter 2 provides the reader with insight into the Emerging Markets. What do the term 
describe, which countries are we talking about, what are their characteristics and why they 
matter in the global economy? Chapter 3 provides an overview over relevant theory of 
economic growth and development, while chapter 4 provides more specific theory of 
economic growth which apply to the economic growth in Emerging Markets: Resource curse, 
middle income trap, inequality and New Institutional Economics (NIE). Chapter 5 describes 
and explains the methodology, while chapter 6 presents the results of the data analysis with 
discussion and chapter 7 presents the findings of a comparative analysis of three major 
Emerging Markets; Brazil, India and China as well as a discussion of the findings in 
accordance with theory and research questions. This is followed by conclusions, policy 
suggestions and suggestions on topics for further research in chapter 8
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Chapter 2 The Emerging Markets 
2.1 The term 
The term «Emerging Market» describes a country that has some characteristics of a developed 
high-income economy, such as the United States, Western Europe and Japan, but does not 
meet the standards of a fully developed economy. They are in a transitional phase between 
developing and developed status. Emerging Markets describe developing countries that are 
not among the poorest nor of the newly industrialized countries, but countries that have the 
potential to become a fully developed economy (Gaeta, 2012b). 
Various terms have been used to describe these countries. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
several group terms were used: Third World economies, least developed countries, newly 
industrializing countries, rapidly developing countries, or high performing (Asian) countries. 
In 1981, the term Emerging Markets was coined by then World Bank Economist, Antoine van 
Agtmael, to describe the more robust economies within the developing world with capital 
markets open to foreign investors, because most other terms were considered either too 
negative or too exclusive (Gaeta, 2012a). 
2.2 Identifying the Emerging Markets 
Which countries are we talking about? Which countries are identified as Emerging Markets? 
For this thesis I select Emerging Markets that fit to the following criteria, based on MSCI 
Classification Framework (Morgan Stanley Capital International, 2016) and (Gaeta, 2012b): 
Emerging Markets are countries that are neither part of the least developed countries, nor of 
the newly industrialized countries. An emerging market is a market big enough to influence in 
the world economy or global politics, in terms of sizeable populations in combination with 
sizeable economic activity, but at the same time without high enough income-levels to qualify 
as a developed market. Emerging Markets are in a transitional phase marked by rapid GDP 
growth towards rule of law and institutional credibility, but they still struggle with economic 
and political instabilities and weak institutional infrastructure. They are markets with 
significant openness and access to foreign ownership and ease of capital inflows/outflows. A 
properly governed stock market is also a key criteria (Gaeta, 2012a; Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, 2016). However, this classification is not based on strict criteria and evolves 
over time. A potential problem is also that countries that earlier were considered Emerging 
Markets, has since developed past the Emerging Market phase. Possible examples of this are 
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South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Also, small countries or countries with limited market 
liquidity are often not considered. 
It is also worth noting the term “Frontier Markets”, a term coined by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) to describe countries either to small, or with investment restrictions, or at a 
to low development level to be considered Emerging Markets. It could describe future 
Emerging Markets or countries that has been considered Emerging Markets in the past, but 
have regressed to frontier status (Berger, Pukthuanthong, & Yang, 2011). The huge difference 
between these two types is that Emerging Markets provide both a better quality of business 
legislation and a more rules-based execution and resolution of legitimate interests. Frontier 
Markets are more dominated by the informal economy, where commercial interests need to be 
based on connections and influence and there is little purpose to go to the local administrative 
or justice systems for business problems and disagreements. These flaws of the institutional 
systems work as major barriers for investors in less developed markets, where there exists less 
incentives for making long-term investments and it is less likely to get their profits and 
investments back out. Markets with a dominance of a formal economic structure like 
prevalence of rule of law, institutions and transparency tend to outperform comparable 
informal economies in the long run. Sustainable growth and economic success is the result of 
decent economic framework conditions. 
The term Bandit economies describes markets with predominately informal economic 
structures; lack of rule of law, institutions, transparency. The figure below shows the gradual 
development towards a developed economy with solid institutions.  
 
Figure 2.1 Structure of Economies (collected from (Gaeta, 2012b, p. 11) 
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Emerging Markets, also called developing markets, has been made a household name after the 
term was first coined in 1981. Popular groupings for Emerging Markets has been made. The 
most visible Emerging Markets has been the much-hyped BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) economies that are dominating by their sheer size, with a quarter of the world’s land 
area as well as 40% of the world’s population. Goldman Sachs investment bank which first 
coined the BRIC-term, have also identified the N-11 “Next eleven” (O’Neill, Wilson, 
Purushothaman, & Stupnytska, 2005), which include other high potential economies like 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South 
Korea and Vietnam. Other popular acronyms and groupings to describe the future growth 
winners in the world economy include BRIC+S(outh 
Africa)+I(ndonesia)+M(exico)+T(urkey) (Goldman Sachs, 2007), CIVETS (Colombia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey South Africa), MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Turkey), D-8 (a group of eight large, mostly Muslim nations; Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey). 
Given the rapid growth of large number of economies, it could be challenging to make an 
exact list of which countries belong to the group of Emerging Markets. There exists different 
versions over which countries are listed, but if you combine the most commonly used and 
most prolific lists from IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2015a) and MSCI (Morgan 
Stanley Capital International, 2016), with Columbia University’s list of where new top 
multinational enterprises come from (Columbia University, 2016) together with Citigroup’s 
list of Global Growth Generators (Buiter & Rahbari, 2011), FTSEs (Financial Times Stock 
Exchange, 2016) lists of Advanced Emerging and Secondary Emerging Markets, as well as 
countries included in terms like BRIC(+S+I+M+T), N-11 “Next eleven”, CIVETS, MINT and 
D-8 you get in total 42 different countries. (See appendix for table of the different lists) 
Nevertheless, the list could easily be shortened to fit more with the ingoing criteria. Countries 
that are OECD-members or fully industrialized European countries like Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Romania as well as 
the Asian fully developed economies of South Korea and Taiwan have way to high GDP per 
capita levels to be included on a list of Emerging Economies. If I also exclude countries that 
have GDP per capita levels in terms of PPP above 20 000 USD, I also exclude Chile, Israel, 
Malaysia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates from the list. Russia is only kept because it is 
one of the BRICs countries and since they are among the four largest emerging and 
developing economies in the world. Jordan is excluded due to their relatively small 
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population, 8 million. Sub-Saharan Africa is unfortunately only represented with southern 
Africa (Republic of South Africa) and Western Africa (Nigeria), so to also add-in the eastern 
African perspective I include three countries without the sufficient size to matter alone, but as 
a region together fits these criteria; The three funding members of the East African 
community, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.  
This leaves me with the following countries/regions: 
Argentina East African community Iraq  Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Egypt    Mexico Peru  Thailand 
Brazil  India    Mongolia Philippines Turkey 
China  Indonesia   Morocco Russia  Venezuela 
Colombia Iran    Nigeria South Africa Vietnam 
Altogether, 25 markets. 
This list could of course be disputed. Jim O’Neill, chief economist of Goldman Sachs, and 
creator of the acronym BRICs says that countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Korea, Indonesia and Turkey no longer should be coined “Emerging Markets” but “Growth 
Markets” since they are already an integrated part of the modern globalized economy 
(O'Neill, 2011). However, no new term has yet to gain traction. 
The Emerging Markets are a very heterogeneous group and hardly comparable, ranging from 
the global manufacturing leader to economies with some of the weakest public governance 
structures. The Emerging Markets include many recent successful stories of countries 
escaping poverty traps and countries that have succeeded in improving institutions and 
infrastructure, raising incomes, lowering infant mortality, improving educational access, 
narrowing gender disparities and increasing life expectancy. Classification by income does 
not necessarily reflect development status, the classification is just as important in terms of 
growth potential. Not all countries at the same income level experience the similar 
development. The refinement is done generally based on their size and growth, as well as their 
growth potential. However, the transition towards a developed economy is by no means 
assured for any of the emerging markets (Gaeta, 2012b, p. 8).  
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2.3 The rise of the Emerging Markets
  
Table 2.1: GDP ranking 2015 (Nominal). Source: (The World Bank, 2016b) 
Over the last decades, the global economic landscape has changed dramatically. There has 
been a transformation in the global economy where the Emerging Markets has gone from 
being only a minor player a few decades ago, to now dominating the world economic growth 
with their commercial activity, economic output and population. While between 1980 and 
1990, the United States, the European Union and Japan accounted for 62 percent of the 
additional world GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP), the subsequent two decades turned in 
favor of developing economies. During the period of 2000 to 2010, the share of additional 
(incremental) GDP growth of the traditionally highly developed economies, the United States, 
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the European Union and Japan fell to around 32 percent at purchasing power parity. For any 
additional unit of world GDP, developing markets accounted for double the value of growth 
of developed markets The complete reversal from two thirds in 1980-1990 to about one third 
between 2000 and 2010 and further predictions of decline to about one quarter of the world’s 
growth happening in developed economies demonstrate the rise of the and importance of 
developing economies (Gaeta, 2012b, pp. 12-13). This has of course had an impact of 
individuals, and according to Forbes 2016 list of billionaires, almost one third of the 100 
richest people in the World are now from so-called Emerging Markets (Forbes, 2016). 
 
Table 2.2: Projected estimate of the 32 largest economies in 2050 in terms of GDP PPP 
(2014 US$bn) with the projected estimate for the same countries in 2030 as well as their GDP 
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in 2014. Source: Predictions 2030 and 2050 (PWC, 2015) and data 2014 (International 
Monetary Fund, 2014) 
According to predictions made by PWC, 4 of the 5 largest and 9 of the 15 largest economies 
in the world in 2050, in terms of GDP, will belong to the group that we now call Emerging 
Markets (PWC, 2015). Economists are already talking about a new economic world order, 
where the Emerging Markets will dominate the world economy in the future. The greatest 
success story of our generation is of course China, and you cannot talk about Emerging 
Markets without China. If you take China of out the Emerging Markets, there would be no 
story of the Emerging Markets (O'Neill, 2011). Their tremendous transformation during the 
last 30 years, inspires other emerging markets, partly backed by the fact that China became 
the second largest economy in the world in 2010 and some analysts believe China will surpass 
the United States GDP by 2030, and become the world’s largest economy (in terms of 
nominal GDP, in terms of PPP China surpassed the United States by 2014) (PWC, 2015; 
Ward, 2012). 
However, some populistic Western politicians have labelled the rise of the Emerging Markets 
as a threat for their own country’s economic growth and have gained support for increased 
trade barriers against the Emerging Markets and associated threats to leave the World Trade 
Organization. International trade is however, not a zero-sum game and protectionism could be 
one of the developed world’s greatest barriers to future economic progress. Increased 
international trade is a win-win situation for most. The rise of the Emerging Markets is 
boosting international trade and thus helping the rest of the world (O'Neill, 2011). This 
concern could be caused by unfamiliarity and a concern that the Western world cannot longer 
influence the rest of the world the way it has done earlier and a fear of a new world order 
“where decades of Westernization are rapidly being replaced by easternization” (Art 
auctioneer Simon de Pury, quoted by O'Neill, 2011, p. 196). 
China is, by 2015, the largest manufacturer and exporter of goods in the world and at the same 
time the fastest growing consumer market and the second largest importer of goods in the 
world (World Trade Organization, 2016). China is also the second largest export market for 
the European Union (after the United States) and their largest import market. The largest 
economy in the European Union and the third largest exporter in the World in terms of USD 
(2015), Germany, now exports more to countries described as Emerging Markets than to their 
neighbor, France. Especially European luxury brands have seen an enormous growth in their 
businesses in Emerging Markets as well as some of the heavier industrial companies including 
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the chemical industry (O'Neill, 2011). Especially the rise of China in low-cost manufacturing 
industries has provided the Western world with cheaper consumer goods and given us 
stronger consumption. The Western world has “traded better” from less efficient industries it 
can afford to lose to more productive jobs. (O'Neill, 2011). 
Even if the center for economic growth has shifted away from the developed markets it does 
not mean that their role will diminish in the upcoming decades. The existing developed 
markets will remain very significant in the global economy due to their low risks and political 
and institutional strengths (PWC, 2015, p. 5). The developed markets will still retain much of 
its leadership in financial markets, for innovation and technological progress and also possibly 
keep its global leadership in terms of military and political functions (Gaeta, 2012b, p. 15). It 
is also worth noting that in PWCs predictions, the growth in both India and China will 
moderate after 2020 as they mature (PWC, 2015). Any such long-term growth predictions are 
also subject to many uncertainties. The growth rates experienced during the last years is also 
difficult to maintain. See also chapter 4.2, the middle-income trap. 
A common factor for many Emerging Markets is that they still struggle with institutional 
weakness. Many of them are still weak in key areas such as rule of law, governance, and 
economic freedoms. They also still have higher inequality, weaker institutions, lower levels of 
education and health than the developed world (Todaro & Smith, 2009). Growth and 
economic success is the consequence of decent economic framework conditions and long-
term sustainable economic growth is dependent on a society with a sustainable basis for 
investment and development. To live up to their potential for many Emerging Markets, 
institutional reforms are needed. There are still much they can undertake to speed economic 
and social progress even further, but the transition towards a developed economy is by no 





Chapter 3 Growth theory overview 
Economic growth is the increase of the market value of the goods and services by an economy 
over time. It is conventionally measured as the percent rate of increase in the real gross 
domestic product adjusted for inflation. Economic growth can be achieved either by more 
efficient use of inputs such as labor productivity, capital, energy or materials or by an increase 
in the amount of inputs available for use, such as expanding the existing workforce or gaining 
more capital (A. V. Banerjee & Duflo, 2005; Bjork, 1999). The field of research in economic 
development is still at relatively early stage and scholars have disagreements about cause and 
effect, but the major long-run causes on this subject that have been argued in some of the 
most influential research literature includes: 
 
3.1 Short-term economic growth 
The Harrod-Domar model is a model for economic growth developed independently by Sir 
Roy F. Harrod and Evsey Domar in 1939 and 1946 respectively. Per the Harrod-Domar 
model, economic growth (g) is dependent on two variables; Savings (s) and capital output 
ratio (k): g=s/k. A high level of saving in a country provides funds for firms to borrow and 
invest. These investments could then generate economic growth through increase in 
production. The capital output ratio measures the productivity of the investment. If the capital 
output ratio decreases the economy will be more productive and fewer inputs generates more 
output. (Harrod, 1939) (Domar, 1946).  
Another, but not completely different model, for economic growth is Walt Whitman Rostow’s 
Stages of Economic Growth Model. This model says, that any country or society that wants to 
go from a traditional static society to the level of an industrialized and specialized society 
with high mass consumption that covers basic needs for all its citizens, must go through five 
basic stages of economic development. To reach this goal, the society must go through a 
transformation; from agriculture to industry, from illiteracy to education, from rural society to 
urban society etc. This transformation is only possible with a high savings rate, mostly more 
than 10% to “take-off”, as well as high levels of innovation and new technology to increase 
productivity (Rostow, 1960).  
A third model on Economic Growth is the Solow-Swan Model. This model says that a 
country’s GDP (Y) is a result of two factors; Labour (L) and Capital (K), and is written as an 
aggregate production function: Y = Ka + L(1-a). In the long run, the economy will reach a long-
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run equilibrium called “steady state” when investments equal the deprecation rate. In steady 
state, growth will only be achieved from technological progress (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) 
The models of Harrod-Domar, Rostow and Solow-Swan only describes short-term economic 
growth. If a country is to achieve sustainable long-term economic growth and development, 
this must be explained by other factors. 
3.2 The process of economic development 
The Handbook of Economic Growth divides the process of economic development into three 
distinct regimes: The Malthusian Epoch, The Post Malthusian Regime, and the Sustained 
Growth Regime (Galor, 2005). The Malthusian Epoch is named after the English cleric and 
scholar Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) who in his book An Essay on the Principle of 
Population  (Malthus, 1798) claimed that the supply of available resources and food could 
only grow at a linear rate while the population growth was exponentially. The shortage of 
available resources would hinder further population growth with wars, disease and starvation. 
  
3.2.1 The Malthusian Epoch 
During the Malthusian epoch, that has characterized most of human history, most humans 
experienced a constant struggle for existence and the technological progress and population 
growth were insignificant by modern standards (Galor, 2005). This stagnation was observed 
all over the world and lasted until the end of the 18th century for the entire world. The average 
growth rate of output per capita ranged from 0% in impoverished regions of Africa, to a rate 
of 0.14% in prosperous Western Europe. Population growth followed this pattern as well; the 
slow pace of resource expansion was reflected in a modest increase in the world’s population. 
The world’s population grew from 231 million people in 1 AD to 268 million in 1000 AD, an 
average growth rate of 0.02% per year. The resource expansion between 1500 and 1820 were 
followed by a growth in the world’s population to from 438 million to 1041 million, an 
average growth of 0.27% per year. Episodes of technological progress, land expansion, 
favorable climatic conditions, or major epidemics brought temporary increases in real wages 
and income per capita (Clark, 2001). In the Malthusian epoch, periods of rising income per 
capita permitted a rise in the number of surviving offspring. Improved nourishment and health 
infrastructure led to increased fertility rates and reduced mortality rates. Periods of rising 
mortality rates like the black death caused an increase in fertility rates, since this led to an 
increase in the number of surviving offspring that could be supported by the existing 
resources (Galor, 2005). 
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3.2.2 The Post-Malthusian Regime 
The take-off from the Malthusian epoch in the developed regions of Western Europe and the 
Western Offshoots (United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), is associated with the 
industrial revolution and the associated technological progress. The transition to the Post-
Malthusian regime occurred in Western Europe and the Western Offshoots at the beginning of 
the 19th century and was followed by a considerable rise in the growth rates of income per 
capita and population (Galor, 2005). This take-off began in some regions, ironically, shortly 
before the publication of Malthus’ influential essay. The take-off in less developed regions 
occurred towards the beginning of the 20th century and delayed well into the end of the 20th 
century for some countries. The average growth rate of output per capita increased 
significantly and was followed by larger differences across regions in standards of living. The 
differential timing in the take-off from the Malthusian regime, increased the gap between the 
richest regions of Western Europe and the Western Offshoots to the impoverished regions of 
Africa from about 3: 1 in 1820 to approximately 5: 1 in 1870. The increase in income per 
capita was channeled partly towards an increase in the size of the population. The Malthusian 
mechanism linking higher income to higher population growth continued to function, but 
income per capita continued to rise despite the offsetting effects of population growth (Galor, 
2005). 
 
The take-off from the Malthusian epoch in the developed regions was associated with a rapid 
process of industrialization as well as a considerable rise in urbanization. The increase of real 
wages income per capita during the post-Malthusian regime also stimulated the accumulation 
of human capital in the form of literacy rates, schooling and health. In the first phase of the 
Industrial Revolution, human capital had a limited role in the production process and was not 
necessarily correlated with industrial development and differed across countries. The rise of 
education was motivated by reasons such as religion, enlightenment and social and national 
cohesion, but in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution the demand for education 
increased, reflecting the increased demand for specialization and skills in the industrialization 
process (Galor, 2005). The average number of years of schooling rose from 2.3 to 5.2 for 
English and Welsh children born in the period between 1801 to 1856 (Matthews, Feinstein, & 
Odling-Smee, 1982). Meantime life expectancy at birth rose from 33 to 40 in England and 
from 25 to 40 in France between 1740 and 1840, reflecting the increased health of the labor 
force. The relative importance of human capital in the process of industrialization increased 
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gradually in less developed economies as well. The post-Malthusian regime ended with a 
decline in population growth in the 1970s in Latin America and Asia, and is still in motion in 
Africa at the beginning of the 21th century. The average years of schooling increased from 3.5 
to 4.4 between 1960 and 1975 in Latin America, from 1.6 to 3.4 between 1960 to 2000 in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and from 1.4 to 1.9 between 1960 and 1975 in South Asia (Barro & Lee, 
2001). 
3.2.3 The Sustained Growth Regime 
The post-Malthusian period ended with the decline in population growth in Western Europe 
and the Western Offshoots, countries that still make up much of the developed economies in 
the world today. The technological progress and industrialization in the Post-Malthusian 
regime combined with the increased accumulation of human capital brought the way for a 
demographic transition to an era of sustained economic growth. In this period, the rise in 
aggregate income were no longer counterbalanced by population growth. This transition 
occurred in Western Europe and the Western Offshoots towards the end of the 19th century, 
while the transition happened in parts of Asia and Latin America towards the end of the 20th 
century. Africa is still struggling to make this transition since their increased resources in the 
Post-Malthusian Regime has mostly been channeled towards population growth (Galor, 
2005). 
Income per capita in Western Europe and the Western Offshoots, advanced at a stable rate of 
about 2% per year in the last century (Galor, 2005, p. 195). This transition to a state of 
sustained economic growth was characterized by increased accumulation of human capital 
combined with a sharp decline in fertility rates which were preceded by a decline in mortality 
in most of the Western world (Galor, 2005, p. 200).  The decline in mortality rates in the 
Western world were corresponding to a gradual increase in life expectancy which generated a 
further inducement for investment in human capital. Life expectancy at birth in England 
continued to rise from about 41 years in the 1870s, to 60 years in 1930 and further increased 
to 81 years in 2014 (The World Bank, 2016b). The rise of life expectancy in less developed 
regions occurred throughout the 20th century. Life expectancy nearly tripled in Asia from 24 
years in 1900 to 66 years in 1999, while life expectancy in Africa more than doubled from 24 
years to 52 years between 1900 and 1999, reflecting diffusion in medical technology as well 
as rise in income per capita (Galor, 2005). 
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The acceleration in the rate of technological progress in the industrialization process further 
increased the demand for human capital. The proportion of English children aged 5 to 14 in 
primary schools increased from 11% to 74% between 1855 and 1900 and a similar pattern 
was observed in other European countries. Literacy rates of English men reached nearly 100% 
at the end of the 19th century (Galor, 2005).  
A factor that enhanced the process of industrialization was the expansion of international 
trade. Due to the rapid industrialization in Northwest Europe as well as the reduction of trade 
barriers and transportation cost, international trade expanded significantly during the 19th 
century. The ratio of world trade to output rose from a level of about 2% in 1800, to 10% in 
1870 and to 21% in 1913 (Estevadeordal, Frantz, & Taylor, 2002, cited by Galor (2005)). 
While much of this trade was between industrial economies, a significant proportion also 
were between industrial and non-industrial economies. By the end of the 19th century a clear 
pattern of specialization had emerged; Western Europe and North America were net importers 
of primary products and net exporters of manufactured goods, while the rest of World were 
exporters of overwhelmingly primary products (Findlay & O'Rourke, 2003, cited by Galor, 
2005). Pomeranz (2009) argues that the technological and development differences were 
minor between Europe and Asia around 1750, but that the discovery of the new world, and 
following colonialism and Atlantic trade as well as trade with Asia, had a major effect on 
European growth starting in the late 16th century and enabled Europe to take off 
technologically. While it appears that technological advances alone could have spawned the 
Industrial Revolution, the expansion of international trade and the associated growth in 
exports increased the pace of industrialization and the growth rate per capita (Galor, 2005).  
3.3 How low-income countries today differ from developed countries in their earlier 
stages 
It should be noted that today’s position of most developing countries differs significantly in 
many important ways from what the developed countries went through in their era of modern 
economic growth. Todaro and Smith (2009) has identified eight significant differences in 
initial conditions: 
For a country to exploit natural resources and sustain long-term economic growth it is 
dependent of its human resources and skills of its people. The population of today’s 
developing nations are often less educated, less informed, less experienced and less skilled 
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than their counterparts were in the early days of the economic growth in the Western countries 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009, p. 72). 
On average, the people living in today’s developing countries also have a lower level of real 
income per capita compared to the levels of their developed-country counterparts had in the 
early days of the economic growth. 40% of the population in developing countries are living 
at bare minimum levels. At the beginning of their era of modern growth, the Western world 
was economically in advance of the rest of the world and could take advantage of their 
position to widen the income gaps between them and them and the rest of the world (Todaro 
& Smith, 2009). 
Before and during the early stages of growth, Western countries experienced a slow rise in 
population growth compared to today’s developing countries. Even if the population growth 
increased during the industrialization process, no Western country had population growth 
rates above 2% per year and generally averaged less. In contrast, the population growth rates 
of many developing countries have exceeded 2.5% per year in decent decades and some are 
even rising that fast today. Another result is that many of today’s developing countries have a 
much higher person-to-land ratio than the Western countries had in their early years of 
growth. Except for the former Soviet Union, no country that experienced a long-term period 
of growth approached the present-day population of India, Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria 
or Brazil, nor were their growth rates anything like Kenya, the Philippines or Bangladesh 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009, p. 7). 
Another obstacle for today’s developing economies compared to the Western world during 
their growth period is the more limited possibilities for emigration to reduce the pressures of 
overpopulation. Between 1850 and 1914, at a time when the world’s population was less than 
a quarter of today’s levels, over 60 million people migrated to the Americas from Europe. 
Their home countries were relieved from the costs of providing people who probably would 
be unemployed as well as reducing likelihood of severe famine and reduced pressure on land. 
A large percentage of the workers’ earnings were also sent home and these countries received 
a significant source of foreign capital. Even though over 50 million people have migrated to 
the Western world from the developing world since 1960, this is not nearly enough to reduce 
their pressures of overpopulation. The reason is not primarily lack of knowledge about 
opportunities in other countries, but the combined effects of distance, and most important the 
very restrictive nature of immigration laws for entering and residing in developed countries. 
The irony of international migration today is that those who can immigrate into developed 
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countries, are the personnel that the developing countries least can afford to lose; The highly 
educated and skilled specialist. Since specialists often move on a permanent basis, the 
developing countries experience what is known as “Brain drain”, which not only represents a 
loss of valuable human resources but could also be a limitation to their future economic 
progress. India, Philippines and a number of African countries to name some, has experienced 
that significant groups of their professional workers; doctors, university teachers, engineers, 
middle- and high level managers has emigrated to North America, Australia and Europe 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009, pp. 75-76). 
International free trade has been called the “engine of growth” and was a major catalyst for 
the development of the Western nations during their growth period.  Rapidly expanding 
export markets combined with increased local demands led to the establishment of large 
manufacturing industries largely based on relatively free trade and movement of capital and 
labor across countries. Even if developing countries has experienced increased export 
volumes, their terms of trade (the relative price they receive for exports to the price of 
imports) has declined over several decades. Developing countries have mostly only been 
successful at becoming producers of lower-cost and simpler products like raw materials, 
textiles, clothing and some light manufactures they still have experienced various forms of 
barriers like tariffs, import quotas, sanitary requirements, licensing and intellectual property 
claims and other restrictions (Todaro & Smith, 2009).  
During the growth process of the Western world they were scientifically and technologically 
greatly ahead of the rest of the world. While developing countries technological industries has 
suffered from the extremely disadvantageous competitive position vis-à-vis the developed 
nations (Todaro & Smith, 2009, p. 77). 
Another difference lies in efficacy of domestic economic, political and social institutions. By 
the time of their early industrialization, many of todays developed nations had economic rules 
of the game that gave broad access to opportunities for entrepreneurs. As discussed later in 
chapter 4, the high inequality and the poor institutions of many developing nations were often 
established for extraction by colonial powers and provide few incentives for increased 
productivity. Such extraction is today often carried out by powerful local interests or 




3.4 Neoclassical growth theory 
In the 1960s, growth theory mainly consisted of neoclassical growth contributions, as 
developed by (Solow, 1956), (Swan, 1956), (Ramsey, 1928), (Cass, 1965), (Koopmans, 
1965). A feature of these models is their convergence hypothesis, which says that the lower a 
country’s starting level of GDP per capita, the higher predicted growth rate. If all economies 
were intrinsically similar, except for their starting capital, then convergence between rich and 
the poor countries would apply in an absolute sense (Barro, 1996). Poor countries would tend 
to grow faster than richer countries. However, in the real world, economies are different in 
various factors; including saving ratio, demography, eagerness to work, access to technology, 
and government policies – thus, the convergence force only applies in a conditional sense. 
Endogenous growth theories follow an extended version of the neoclassical models, and 
include possible explanation for long-term growth including government policies, human 
capital and the diffusion of technology. Technological improvements can be important to 
understand why GDP per capita can continue to grow indefinitely. 
3.5 Are the living standards between developing and developed nations converging? 
During the last two centuries, we have witnessed dramatic changes in the distribution of 
income and population and a great divergence has occurred across regions in income per 
capita. The major factor behind has been the differential timing of the take-off from 
stagnation to growth and the corresponding variations in the timing of the demographic 
transition (Galor, 2005). Inequality in the world economy was almost negligible until the 17th 
century and while the ratio of GDP per capita between the richest region (Europe and the 
Western Offshoots) and the poorest region (Africa) was only 2:1 in 1500 and 3:1 in 1820 it 
has widened considerably, today that ratio is near 100:1 (Todaro & Smith, 2009, pp. 78-81). 
This leaves no doubt that the developed countries of today has experienced far higher rates of 
economic growth than the developing countries of today. If their growth experience was 
similar, and you would expect a convergence of living standards between developed and 
developing nations again, developing nations should “catch up” by growing faster than the 
developed nations. The reasons to expect that to happen is because of technological transfer 
and the fact that they do not have to “reinvent the wheel” but simply copy the technology and 
successes that made the developed nations grow without the mistakes and dead-ends along. 
The later a country begins its modern economic growth, the shorter time they need to double 
the input per worker. One example is the development success story of South Korea where 
they doubled their input in just 11 years, compared to the United Kingdom that needed 60 
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years to achieve the same during their first years of economic development. You would also 
expect developing countries to be more attractive for investors because the marginal output of 
capital and investments would be higher in developing markets where capital intensity is 
lower. Despite the huge differences today, you would expect at least some tendencies of 
convergence between the group of countries (Galor, 2005). However, the poorer countries 
have tended to grow slower than the richer countries during the last 50 years. The differences 
between low- and high-income countries today may be very difficult to change. A poor 
country cannot force a rich country to lower its trade barriers. The only convergence 
witnessed has been among the OECD countries, nevertheless it is difficult to find, if any 
convergence between the least developed and the developed countries. This is likely a clear 
reflection of the differences in growth conditions between the groups of countries. The rapid 
growth in China and the recent acceleration of growth in South Asia, is at least a limited 
convergence towards developed countries income levels. In the period between 1990 and 
2003 income grew at 24% in OECD countries while it grew 56% in South Asia and 196% in 
China in the same period. Meanwhile, even though these regions grew faster in the period 
from 1990 to 2003, because of China and South Asia’s relatively low starting levels the gains 
in the OECD countries were larger in terms of absolute amount. The long-run path to catch-up 
is still a huge gap to fill and despite the current per capita income convergence many of the 
poorest countries remain in absolute stagnation (Todaro & Smith, 2009, pp. 78-81). 
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Chapter 4 Theoretical background and relevant literature 
There is still little consensus what the fundamental cause of large differences in income per 
capita between countries are, but especially differences in institutions and property rights have 
received considerable attention in recent years. In this chapter I will go through relevant 
theory on the challenges that are experienced by the Emerging Markets: the resource curse, 
the middle-income trap, Robert Barro’s Determinants of Economic Growth, inequality and 
New Institutional Economics. 
4.1 The resource curse 
“I call petroleum the devil’s excrement. It brings trouble… Look at this locura - waste, 
corruption, consumption, our public services falling apart. And debt, debt we shall have for 
years”. 
These are the powerful words of Juan Pablo Péres Alfonso, the Venezuelan politician 
primarily responsible for the creation of OPEC, during the oil-boom of the mid-1970s. A 
quote by the former Saudi-Arabian minister of Petroleum, Ahmed Zaki Yamani also 
highlights a similar experience: “all in all, I wish we had discovered water” (Ross, 1999). The 
so-called “resource curse” states that resource-rich countries will have slower economic 
growth compared to similar countries without large natural resources (Ross, 1999). In the 
traditional Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, natural resources have been viewed as 
a blessing for developing economies (Ricardo, 1817). But, since the 1980s there has been 
shown empirically and analyzed in several studies even after controlling for trends in 
commodity prices that countries that are rich in natural resources tends to experience lower 
growth rates than countries with less natural resources has been shown. Studies, which 
include (Auty, 1990), (Gelb, 1988), (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001), (Lane & Tornell, 1996), 
(Gylfason, Herbertsson, & Zoega, 1999) show that on average resource abundant countries 
lag behind countries with less resources. 
However, we cannot say that all resource rich countries are marked by this curse. Even 
though, most resource abundant countries are affected by negative economic, political and 
social outcome, resource rich countries like Botswana, Norway, Canada and Australia are 
among countries that has done quite well. (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006) argue that the 
resource curse only appears in countries with inferior institutions and that the resource curse 
vanishes for countries with better institutions. This hypothesis is supported with observations 
from several countries. Norway was one of the poorest countries in Europe in 1900, but are 
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now among the richest. This growth has been led by natural resources such as timber, fish and 
hydroelectric power and more recently oil and gas. Norway is considered one of the most 
stable democracies and least corrupt countries in the world. Since its independence from the 
United Kingdom in 1966, Botswana has had the highest average economic growth rate in the 
world with an average of 9% per year from 1966 to 1999 (2015). Based on its purchasing 
power parity, gives a standard of living around that of Mexico and Turkey. This growth has 
been built on mining of diamonds. Meanwhile, Botswana has been rated as the least corrupt 
country in Africa (sharing the spot as the 28th least corrupt country in the world with 
Portugal), according to Transparency International (2016). Mehlum et al. (2006) predicts that 
natural resource abundance only hinder economic growth in countries with weak institutions 
such as weak rule of law, malfunctioning bureaucracy, and widespread corruption. 
However, the resource curse applies in resource-rich countries with weak institutions. The 
extremely resource-abundant countries such as the Oil States in the Gulf, or Nigeria, or 
Mexico and Venezuela have been resource-rich for a long time, but have not experienced 
sustained rapid economic growth. These findings are as mentioned, not easily explained by 
other variables, since these findings survive well after the introduction of a long list of control 
variables. 
4.1.1 What is the curse? 
As mentioned earlier, a large number of studies has shown empirically, that natural resource 
abundance or at least abundance on some natural resources reduces economic growth. 
Wheeler (1984) found that among sub-Saharan African countries, those that were rich in 
minerals grew slower than countries that did not have significant mineral resources during the 
1970s. Gelb (1988) found a negative correlation between natural resources and economic 
growth present in hard mineral economies and even more in oil exporting economies.  
Scholars have also suggested that the problems of resource abundant countries go beyond low 
economic growth. Studies, among them Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Collier and Hoeffler 
(2005) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) suggests that abundance of natural resources is 
associated with civil wars and the number of battle related deaths. 
Studies on the resource curse also suggests that abundance on natural resources is associated 
with low levels of democracy. Ross (2001, pp. 321-322) concluded after examining data from 
113 states between 1971 and 1997 that “a state’s reliance on oil or mineral exports tends to 
make it less democratic; that this effect is not caused by other types of primary exports; that is 
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not limited to the Arabian Peninsula, to the Middle East; or to sub-Saharan Africa; and that 
is not limited to small states”.  
Most studies which try to explain the resource curse suggests that the main problem with 
abundance on natural resources is not the natural resources or the skewed export itself, but 
that it creates rents – excess earnings above normal profits. These rents are seen as a 
contributor to negative development outcomes by promoting rent-seeking behavior by the 
political elites and/or the social actors, as well as weakening the state capacity to regulate and 
supervise the economy, empowering social elements that are opposed to growth-promoting 
policies, or encouraging foreign intervention (Rosser, 2006). Several scholars have also 
suggested that the problem is not abundance on natural resources, but abundance on particular 
natural resources. They have pointed out “point source” natural resources – for instance; oil, 
minerals and plantation crops – as particularly problematic. Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and 
Busby (2002) found that countries rich in point source natural resources grew more slowly 
during the 1980s and 1990s than countries that are rich in natural resources like wheat and 
plantation crops like cocoa and coffee. 
4.1.2 Explanations for the resource curse 
Even if there are strong evidences that there is a resource curse, scholars argue on which 
variables that are attributed as explanation for the curse. We lack a universally accepted 
theory of the curse of natural resources (Sachs & Warner, 2001). 
Dutch Disease is one of the most cited explanations of the resource curse. Dutch disease 
describes the combined influence of two effects that commonly follow resource booms and 
makes a country’s tradable goods less competitive in world markets. The first effect is that 
appreciation of the currency caused by the sharp rise in exports could lead to a competitive 
disadvantage for the other exporting industries and other sectors of the economy suffering 
because imports become cheaper for all sectors. The other effect is the tendency of a booming 
resource sector to draw capital and labor away from a country’s manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors and raising their production costs (Ross, 1999). This could lead to 
unemployment and loss of manufacturing capabilities in the nation. The decrease in other 
sectors exposed to international competition leads to even greater dependence on the natural 
resource revenue and leaves the economy vulnerable to price changes in the natural resource. 
Dutch disease has its name after the discovery of a massive natural gas field in Groningen in 
1959. The Netherlands sought to tap this resource by exporting the gas for profits. With focus, 
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mainly on gas exports, their currency appreciated, and harmed the country’s ability to export 
other products. This in turn led to the Netherlands experiencing a recession (Fardmanesh, 
1991). This processes has been witnessed in several resource exporting countries in the world, 
one of the most visible examples are Venezuela (oil) and Angola (diamonds and oil). Another 
explanation to the resource curse is that international commodities markets are subject to 
unusually sharp price fluctuations. These fluctuations are transferred to the states domestic 
economies making government revenues and foreign exchange supplies unreliable thus 
making private investments more risky (Nurkse, 1958). 
It has also been argued that one of the reasons of the curse is economic concentration. 
Resource industries are not likely to stimulate growth in rest of the economy, but are instead, 
because of the higher salaries available than elsewhere in the economy, damaging the other 
sectors by attracting the best talents and the most skilled personnel. Another perspective on 
the resource curse suggest that natural resources help maintaining government monopoly 
power because the natural resources provides steady income for the government, and the 
governments are able to use government spending and low taxes to reduce pressures for 
democratization (Lam & Wantchekon, 2002). Despotic and authoritarian leaders could keep 
their positions and avoiding the need for broad economic and social development. The 
resource incomes also gives the political elites the opportunity to consolidate their power and 
neglect their people by preventing social and cultural changes such as rising education levels 
and specialization that facilitate specialization (Ross, 2001). 
The general assumption is that the political and social elites in resource abundant countries 
have a high degree of autonomy from domestic social groups because the states are 
financially independent of them. Because the domestic social groups do not have to fund the 
state, they also make few demands of it (Rosser, 2006). Economic diversification may also be 
neglected by the government or delayed in the light of the (temporary) high profitability of the 
limited natural resources. The abundance of revenue from natural resources discourages long-
term investment in infrastructure which could support a more diverse economy. While the 
resource sectors tend to provide large financial revenues, they often provide few jobs and tend 




4.2 The middle-income trap 
“In fact, over the last four decades few countries except for a few, East Asian ones have 
converged to the income levels of the rich countries. The vast majority of growth spurts tends 
to run out of gas after a while” (Rodrik, 2005, p. 996). 
 
Many countries that escape poverty experience periods with high growth, followed by 
stagnation and even decline, or are stuck at low growth rates. They are caught in the middle 
Income Trap, where they are unable to compete with high-skill, innovative and advanced 
economies (Gill & Kharas, 2008). Few countries can sustain high economic growth without 
changing strategies and even fewer continue to keep high growth rates after they have reached 
middle-income status. The strategies that helped countries grow during the low-income stage, 
are the same that prevents them from moving beyond the middle-income stage. Growth in 
low-income countries can be generated by moving their labor force from low-productivity 
activities to activities with higher productivity. The movement in China of surplus agricultural 
labor to the industry is a classic example of how growth happens in low-income settings. This 
is an export-led strategy, where the strategy for fast growth is aimed at diversifying and 
building domestic production in most goods and services and focusing on the supply-side of 
an economy (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). The growth-strategies for middle-income countries 
differs from this. The growth tends to be more capital- and skill-intensive on the supply side 
and being more oriented towards services. A significant difference from the low-income 
growth-strategies is the increased focus on demand. Due to the higher wages and decline in 
cost competitiveness, exports cannot be as easily expanded as before. Export growth is 
depending on the introduction of new processes and finding new markets (Kharas & Kohli, 
2011). 
 
Most Latin American countries, has failed to make the transition from resource-driven growth 
driven by low-cost labor to productivity-driven growth driven by specialization and 
innovation and becoming advanced economies. This is in sharp contrast with the so-called 
“East Asian Tigers” of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, that were able to 
move first from low-income to middle-income status, and then from middle-income to high-
income status, almost without interruption during the past 50 years (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). 
In the article “What is the Middle-income trap, why do countries fall into it, and how can it be 
avoided?” Kharas and Kohli (2011) discuss the divergent experiences of Latin America, 
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especially Brazil and the East Asian tigers. They find that the East Asian tigers managed three 
critical transitions that Latin America has failed (Kharas & Kohli, 2011, p. 286): 
1) “From diversification to specialization in production 
2) From physical accumulation of factors to productivity-led growth 
3) From centralized to decentralized management” 
 
4.2.1 Specialization and technological focus 
Specialization was crucial to allow the East Asian countries to benefit from economies of 
scale and to offset the disadvantages and cost associated with higher wages (Kharas & Kohli, 
2011). They developed and supported domestic and international global champions in specific 
areas. South Koreas government involved actively in the industrial transformation from labor-
intensive industries into heavy and chemical industries. The economic development of South 
Korea was heavily based on the emergence of large business conglomerates like Samsung, 
Hyundai and LG. The emergence of these conglomerates was an efficient response to the 
institutional voids that often characterize an economy during its underdevelopment phase 
(Levy & Kuo, 1991). Their mindset to become global also played an important role. Since the 
South Korean domestic market is very small, the companies had to be outward-focused to 
survive against domestic competition. Also, development of a good social-safety nets and 
skill-retraining nets are policy ingredients that could help the managing difficulties associated 
with the restructuration that accompanies specialization (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). O'Neill 
(2011) suggests one common variable to be more supportive to future economic growth than 
any other, technology. New developments in communication is the leader in this new phase of 
globalization where national economic borders are being eroded and makes it easier to 
participate in global business and markets. 
 
4.2.2 Growth based on total factor productivity 
A focus on total factor-productivity growth requires major changes in education, from 
primary schooling to tertiary education. The knowledge economy which is proven to be a 
source of major technological process need a critical mass of high skilled and high-productive 
professionals (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). To escape the middle-income trap, they need to focus 
on building institutions for development of human capital. High skilled professionals cannot 
be created overnight and require long-term investments and planning. Sustainable growth is 
not possible without focusing on building a good infrastructure for science and technology 
which is achieved with a strong education system (Mudambi, 2015). The education system 
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must be fitted to a knowledge and innovation economy (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). A 
noteworthy feature is the dramatic differences between Brazil and South Korea in the levels 
of innovation capacity. The number of patents assigned to South Korean entities were 84 751 
by 2010, while the corresponding figure for Brazil was only 3034. If you compare patents per 
capita, the differences are even more dramatic considering that Brazil have a population of 
200 million while South Korea only have a population of 50 million (Dutta, Lanvin, & 
Wunsch-Vincent, 2014). Innovation must also be accompanied by investment and capital 
accumulation. If there are few options for financing, incentives are low and barriers are high 
for developing new technology (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). 
 
4.2.3 Decentralization, income distribution and expansion of the middle-class 
Modern economies tend to be complex and policymakers require large amounts of 
information as well as the need to address local issues of opportunity and distribution. This is 
more difficult to achieve with a centralized system. However, local governments could more 
easily being captured by special interests than a centralized government (Kharas & Kohli, 
2011). To increase domestic demand, an expansion of a middle class is also needed. The 
growth rate will slow down if there is no development of the middle class. Latin American 
countries has enjoyed several episodes of fast growth, followed by financial crisis which has 
prevented them from becoming advanced economies. To avoid the middle-income trap, 
macroeconomic growth must be associated with income distribution (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). 
Formal economic models show that stagnation of the middle class and growing concentration 
of income have been negatively affected recovery from the great recession of 2008. Export-
led growth is vulnerable to slowdowns in the global economy, but a large middle class 
provides a cushion of domestic demand and some protection against strong negative effects. 
Brazils recovery from this crisis has partly been attributed to social policies for income 
distribution and the country’s doubling of its middle class since 1978 (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). 
 
4.2.4 The importance of political leadership   
The transitions require strong political leadership as well as long-term focus on economic 
growth which engages in a sustained process of institutional development as well as high 
quality-interaction with the private sector. These ingredients were present in each of the East 





4.2.5 Demographics, investment ratios and inflation 
When analyzing the correlations of growth slowdowns and the middle-income trap 
Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2013, p. 3) found that “slowdowns were positively associated 
with high growth in the earlier period (suggestive of mean reversion), with unfavorable 
demographics (high old-age dependency ratios in particular), with very high investment 
ratios (as if growth fueled by brute-force capital formation eventually becomes 
unsustainable), and with an undervalued exchange rate (as if countries with undervalued 
currencies have less incentive to move up the technological ladder out of unskilled-labor-
intensive, low-value-added sectors and thus find it more difficult to sustain rapid growth)”. 
These results are considered suggestive, particularly for China. 
 
4.3 Robert Barro’s Determinants of Economic Growth 
Based on empirical findings from a panel of around 100 countries from 1960 to 1990, Robert 
Barro at Harvard University, found that for a given starting level of real per capita GDP, the 
economic growth rate was enhanced by higher initial schooling and life expectancy, lower 
fertility, lower government consumption, better maintenance of the rule of law, lower 
inflation and improvements in the terms of trade (Barro, 1996). 
Barros’ findings also supported that the extent of democracy did not emerge as a critical 
determinant of economic growth. With low levels of political rights, an expansion of political 
rights could stimulate economic growth, but once a moderate amount of democracy was 
attained, further expansion reduced growth. A possible explanation of this effect is that in 
extreme dictatorships an increase in political rights tends to be followed by an increase in 
economic growth, because limitations on governmental authority is critical. However, if there 
already has been achieved some political rights, further democratization may retard growth 
because of increased focus on income redistribution and social programs. In contrast to the 
small effect of democracy on growth, there is a strong positive influence of the standard of 
living on a country’s propensity to experience democracy. This relation is known as the Lipset 
hypothesis (Lipset, 1959). Among the measures of standard of living found to predict 
democracy include real per capita GDP, life expectancy, and smaller gap between male and 




4.3.1 Growth Environment Score (GES) 
Higher productivity is critical for sustaining growth. O’Neill et al. (2005) suggests that the 
key to converting potential into reality is to strengthen long-term conditions for growth; 
macroeconomic stability, political institutional development, trade and investment openness 
and education. They also introduce the Growth Environment Score (GES), a ranking system 
which aims to summarize the overall conditions for economic growth. GES is a ranking 
system to forecast a country’s chances of converging onto the developed world’s income 
levels. The measure system drew primarily on the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database. The index is ranking are ranking 170 different countries growth 
environment on a score from 10.0 (best) to 1.0 (worst). GES can be divided into five basic 
areas (O’Neill et al., 2005): Macroeconomic stability, Macroeconomic conditions, 
Technological capabilities, Human capital and Political stability. The GES index variables 
has been found to have a significant and relatively robust effect on growth in various cross-
country growth regressions. Their main reference is Robert Barro’s influential research 
(Barro, 1996). No ranking system like this can ever be perfect, but the authors believe it gave 
a reasonable mean of forecasting a country’s chances to reach the income levels of the 
developed world. However, it is not known exactly what causes productivity to increase and if 
it were known, economic growth would be predictable, achievable and easy to attain. 
(O'Neill, 2011, p. 36) 
4.4 Inequality 
 
Figure 4.1: Per capita income and inequality (Collected from (W. Easterly, 2005, p. 4))  
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The effect of inequality on economic development is hotly debated. Engerman and Sokoloff 
(2005) suggest that inequality is a determinant of bad institutions, low human capital 
investment and underdevelopment. There is strong evidence of an association between 
inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient averaged over the last 3 decades, and the level of 
per capita income today (W. Easterly, 2005). This effect of inequality hindering economic 
development is shown to be statistically significant (W. Easterly, 2005, p. 22). However, this 
causality could also be reversed; that rich countries can afford redistribution. Engerman and 
Sokoloff (2005) suggested that the elite in Latin America opposed democracy and mass 
investment in human capital because of the fear that the poor majority would gain power and 
redistribute income and rents away from the elite towards the majority. Since people with 
more human capital are more likely to be politically active, the elites wanted to suppress 
democracy and equal rights to preserve their privileged positions. High inequality makes poor 
institutions difficult to reform, since the small elite are not served with any change of the rules 
of the game. Recent research agrees that forces that protect narrow elites and limit the access 
to opportunities for advancement for the broader population are major obstacles of successful 
economic development (Todaro & Smith, 2009).  
Todaro and Smith (2009, pp. 236-237) lists several reasons why reduction of poverty and 
acceleration of growth is not in conflict, and why we should be concerned with inequality 
above the poverty line. One of the reasons why we should also focus on relative poverty and 
not only on absolute poverty is that widespread poverty makes large groups of the population 
unable to finance their children’s education and instead have many children as a source of 
old-age security. These factors together, is a major cause of less per capita growth. The rich in 
many of today’s poor countries are also generally not noted for their frugality or desire to save 
and invest in the local economy. The rich tend to spend more of their additional income on 
imported luxury goods or seeking safe havens abroad, so-called capital flight. Instead of 
increasing a country’s productive resources, they instead represent substantial drains. 
Moreover, raising the income of the poor would likely increase the levels of financial savings 
and investments like education for their children and improved housing and nutrition for their 
families who in turn increases local economic activity. With high inequality, the overall rate 
of saving in the economy tend to be smaller, low- and middle-income individuals spend 
increased money on investment not on consumption. Rich people save a smaller fraction of 
their marginal income compared to lower income individuals. Low income and low levels of 
living for the poor also causes poor health, nutrition and education which in turn could lead to 
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lower economic productivity for large groups of the population. Extreme income disparities 
also undermine the social stability and solidarity. High inequality facilitates rent seeking 
(corruption) where resources are diverted from productive purposes that could increase 
economic growth. A reduction in mass poverty is also suggested as a powerful incentive for 
widespread participation in economic development. Poverty reduction, however is not 
necessarily followed by and is possible without economic growth. Finally, from an ethical 
view, extreme inequality is viewed as unfair. Much of the inequality is based on luck or 
extraneous factors like who your parents and grand-parents where, not on skills and hard 
work. Nevertheless, some inequality is always needed in a society. If everyone had the same 
income no matter their efforts, there would be less incentives for hard work or innovation 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009). 
 
4.5 New Institutional Economics 
There is never one single cause or explanation for economic development, but one of the key 
parts to explain it is the quality of (or lack of) institutions (Ostrom, 2008). This is the focus 
for literature based on New Institutional Economics (NIE). While large natural resources or 
new technology could explain short-term economic growth, institutions are the fundamental 
cause of long-run growth and sustainable economic development. Research has shown that 
missing, weak or perverse institutions are the roots of underdevelopment and poverty 
(Shirley, 2005). Investments, technological innovations, years of schooling or other 
explanations for development are not correlated with higher rates of economic growth (W. R. 
Easterly, 2001). However, large and statistically significant correlations between institutional 
variables and growth are persistently demonstrated in cross-country regressions.  
According to North (1990) countries with better institutions, reflected by more secure 
property rights and better policies will invest more in both physical and human capital, and 
are more likely to achieve greater level of income. When you compare historical and current 
states, that differ only in quality of institutions like North and South Korea or West and East 
Germany, it is obvious that institutions matter. However, it should be noted that the effect 
could be reversed; that rich countries chose or can afford better institutions (D. Acemoglu, S. 





4.5.1 What are Institutions? 
Institutions could be difficult to study because institutions are mostly invisible. There are 
multiple definitions what an institution is. The definition used by Douglas North is that 
institutions are the external representation of the belief systems in a society (North, 2008). 
They are the prevailing rules of the game and includes both formal rules embodied in 
constitutions, laws, contracts, and market regulations, plus their informal rules which is 
reflected in norms of behavior and conduct, values, customs, and the generally accepted ways 
of doing things (Todaro & Smith, 2009). 
 
Organizations are the players of the game and are made up of groups of individuals held 
together by some shared objectives and beliefs. Examples of organizations are economic 
organizations like; firms, trade unions, cooperatives; political organizations like political 
parties, legislatures, regulatory bodies and human resource organizations like universities, 
schools, training centers, hospitals, health centers etc. The short-term objectives for 
organizations may be profit maximizing (firms) or political power (political parties); but the 
long-term objective for any organization is survival, because we live in a world with scarcity 
of limited resources and hence competition. Improving the efficiency compared to its rivals, is 
the key to survival of the organization (North, 2008). Humans (and organizations) attempt to 
reduce risk or uncertainty by following path dependence – the way which institutions and 
beliefs derived in the past influence present choices. The institutional framework defines the 
rules for what is acceptable behavior in a specific context and determines the incentive 
structure of a society. The organizations that come into existence will reflect the incentive 
structure of a society: “If the highest rate of return in an economy comes from piracy, we can 
expect that the organizations will invest in skills and knowledge that will make them better 
pirates” (North, 2008, p. 23). If there are high returns from productive activities, we can 
expect that the organizations will invest their resources into skills and knowledge that 
improves their productivity. Similarly, if an organization has secure monopoly or little or no 
competition, they will have less incentive to invest in new knowledge or further 
improvements, and consequently will not induce major institutional change. The result will be 
stable institutional structures and little institutional change. The institutional framework 
provides the incentive structure that dictates the kinds of skills and knowledge perceived to 





4.5.2 What institutions are important for economic growth? 
Some ways of organizing societies will encourage people to be innovative, to take risks, to 
save for the future, to find better ways of doing things, to learn and educate themselves, to 
solve problems of collective action and to provide public goods, while other ways of 
organizing societies do not. Institutions are one of the key fundamental reasons that makes 
one country successful in terms of economic development while other countries fails to 
succeed (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005). To meet the challenge of development, 
countries need an institutional framework that supports a market economy. According to 
Shirley (2005) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), useful institutions can be 
categorized into three different categories: The first category are Institutions forming units of 
social behavior, the second category is Institutions that foster efficient economic exchange, 
the third category is Institutions that Protect Property and Persons. 
 
Institutions forming units of social behavior (Rodrik et al., 2004) are for example a religion or 
a nation, “Integrative institutions”. A well know example of this is the thesis that the 
protestant work ethics was an important force behind the emerge of capitalism in Northern 
Europe (Weber, 1905). Institutions that foster efficient economic exchange (Shirley, 2005) are 
institutions that lowers transaction costs and encourages trust. Transaction costs are the costs 
of finding a trading partner, deciding terms of the trade (bargaining and decision cost), 
making a contract/agreement, as well as the monitoring and enforcing of the contract.  
Important is commercial rules and norms, shared values, contracts and contract enforcement 
mechanisms. “If the costs of making an exchange are greater than the gains with that 
exchange would bring, that exchange will not take place…” (Coase, 1992, p. 197). High 
transaction costs in a society leads to less trade, less specialization, less investment, and thus, 
lower productivity. In societies where the institutions increase the certainty that contracts will 
be honored, individuals and organizations will also be more willing to specialize, investing, as 
well as undertaking complex transactions and sharing their knowledge (North, 1990, p. 34).  
The third category of useful institutions are Institutions that Protect Property and Persons 
(Shirley, 2005), for example constitutions, electoral rules, laws governing speech and 
education, and norms that motivate people to abide by laws and cooperate in monitoring 
government. The most developed countries today are those with a state with power to assure 
stability and peace and protecting property rights, but at the same time have mechanisms that 
limit state power, such as independent parliaments and judiciaries or federalism. In countries 
where property rights are insecure and transaction costs are high, resources will more likely 
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be channeled into activities with rapid returns, while resources will be siphoned off as bribes 
or security. In these countries and societies individuals are more likely to engage in non-
productive activities like rent seeking and war lording, than by investing their resources into 
production, innovation and learning (Shirley, 2005). Much of the world’s population, lives in 
countries where the state is either too weak to prevent theft of property by private actors, or 
the state is so strong that the state itself threatens private property rights and private 
independence. In both cases, individuals and organizations face a high risk that they will not 
be able to realize a return if they invest in specific skills, knowledge or physical assets, so 
they avoid investing because of the uncertain outcome. Thus, production, innovation and 
productivity are low and the economy stagnates. An associating problem in such economies is 
that education will not necessarily provide a way out of this low level trap, because the quality 
of education is different from economies that provide incentives to invest in the future 
(Shirley, 2005). In countries where incentives to invest in the future are low, the quality of 
education will not be monitored by the society, teachers have little pressure or incentives to 
provide good education for their students. This leads to poor educational quality and 
associated under-investment in learning combined with “brain-drain” of high potential 
individuals (W. R. Easterly, 2001). It is also worth noting, that past economic success is not 
guarantee for wealth today, the currently underdeveloped economies of former wealthy 
countries such as Egypt or China is a magnificent example of that (Shirley, 2005).  
 
4.5.3 Why have so few countries created and sustained the rules and norms that foster 
growth and social progress? 
New Institutional economics (NIE) has made some progress towards answering why so few 
countries have could create and sustain institutions that foster growth and social progress. 
Some of the literature on this subject focuses on the colonial past of many underdeveloped 
countries (Shirley, 2005). During the last 600 years, most of the countries which we call 
underdeveloped were colonized at some time. However, some of the richest and most 
developed countries today; United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand are also former 
colonies, so a history as a former colony might not always be the full explanation of poor 
institutions. North (1990) has suggested that the colonial powers created institutions that 
mirrored their own that did not have roots in and functioned with the local cultures. While 
Spain brought a centralized government and little functional bureaucracy as well as a system 
with property rights that favored the nobility, Great Britain brought its decentralized, limited 
government to their colonies. Nevertheless, this fails to explain why the British heritage has 
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not brought prosperity to their former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean or South Asia. Other 
argue that the institutions the Europeans imposed on their colonies depended on the 
conditions they found there. In regions such as Latin America, India or Africa that had a large 
population that could be enslaved or a climate that supported a plantation agriculture or large 
mineral resources, the colonies were a source for economic rent and they created institutions 
where political power were concentrated in the hands of a few for systematic exploitation of 
the rest of the population (Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, & James A Robinson, 2001). 
While in the Northern US and Canada, which was sparsely populated and less suited for 
plantations, Europeans settled in large numbers and brought beneficial institutions with wide 
participation and private property rights. And when the industrialization began in the 19th 
century, the countries burdened with extractive colonial institutions lacked secure property 
rights and provided few opportunities for technological innovation and economic growth, 
while the former colonies with higher institutional quality industrialized rapidly. D. Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) suggest a theory of institutional differences among countries colonized by 
Europeans based on differences in mortality rates among settlers. Different colonization 
policies created different sets of institutions. Some colonies were mostly set up for extraction 
of resources to the colonial power. In these colonies, the European powers did not introduce 
much protection of private property or provide checks and balances against government 
expropriation. An extreme example of this is the Belgian colonization of what is now the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Better institutions, however, were built were Europeans 
migrated and settled in large numbers. Here European institutions were replicated with strong 
emphasis on private property and checks against government power. Examples include United 
States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. (D. Acemoglu et al., 2001) argue that the 
colonization strategies were influenced by the feasibility to establish permanent European 
settlements. Where the disease environment was not favorable to Europeans, it was more 
likely of an extractive state. The colonial institutions persisted even after these colonies got 
their independence. This hypothesis is supported by data on the different colonies mortality 
rates of soldiers, bishop and sailors stationed between the seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries, which show that in colonies where Europeans faced higher mortality rates today are 
substantially poorer than colonies that were healthier for the Europeans. The article however, 
argues that mortality rates are not the only or the main cause of variation in institutions, but a 
source of exogenous variation. It should also be noted that colonial experience does not only 
mean areas that were directly controlled by Europeans, but also areas that experienced 
European influence, like sub-Saharan Africa that were strongly affected by colonialism in 
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centuries before they became European colonies due to the Atlantic slave trade. Also, 
Government expropriation is not the only institutional feature that matter, expropriation is 
also related to constraints on government expropriation, independent judiciary, enforcement 
of property rights as well as institutions providing equal access to education and ensuring civil 
liberties, which are all important to encourage investment and growth (D. Acemoglu et al., 
2001). 
 
Other argue that the explanation for poor institutions is not colonialism, but too little conflict 
of the sort that led the elites in Western Europe to make compromises and build good 
institutions to win supporters, raise revenues and defeat foreign enemies. (North & Weingast, 
1989) focus particularly on England’s Glorious Revolution in 1688 were the King was forced 
to accept a permanent role for the Parliament as well as greater independence for the judiciary 
and prohibitions against the Crown's arbitrary violation of personal liberties in exchange for 
funds and fighters needed to fight foreign wars. The absence of this form of wars to establish 
territorial boundaries as well as part of nation building, is viewed as an explanation for the 
underdeveloped institutions in many poor countries today. Instead of pre-colonial African 
states building effective institutions to defend their boundaries, the extensive conflicts were 
over slaves, mineral wealth or ethnic rivalries. Later, the Europeans made matters worse by 
doing little to build state institutions and by drawing national borders with opposing ethnic 
groups, setting the stage for continual civil war (Herbst, 2014). Other studies try to explain 
variations in quality of institutions by focusing on beliefs, norms and culture. One of the 
explanations of the emerge of capitalism in Northern Europe (Weber, 1905) is the thesis that 
the protestant work ethics was an important force behind. Greif (1993) focused on how the 
cultural beliefs and community ties between the Jewish Maghribi traders were successful in 
creating trust without written documents, but at the same time limited their trade to their own 
network while the Christian Genovese traders grew rich through expansion of their trade. 
Keefer and Knack (2008) however, found that norms that encourage people to cooperate even 
with people they have no family, business or other relational ties with, have economic 
payoffs. Knack and Keefer also suggests two factors increasing development-promoting 
norms: Income equality and education. Studies of East Asian countries suggests that part of 
the reason why they have experienced more economic growth and produced better social 
welfare measures than other less developed economies lies in their relatively high levels of 




Institutions that protected property and supported strong market economies in Western Europe 
emerged gradually due to long and disorderly adaption and experimentation spurred by 
competition and wars. Additional research will be needed on this topic; it could be other 
circumstances that produced a supportive institutional environment that are missing in many 
other places. Location is also advantageous for institutional development. Stimulus from the 
rest of Europe has played a key role in the development of Western European countries 
(North, 2006). Despite disagreements on the ultimate determinants of institutional 
development, the different explanations converge on two underlying causes: great equality in 
combination with enough political competition to limit the rulers from expropriation.  
 
4.5.4 Which institutions must function effectively if countries are to develop? 
A host of variables has turned out to be statistically significant. Roll and Talbott (2001 cited 
by); (Shirley, 2005, p. 626) found nine highly significant variables, holding up in multiple 
regressions: trade barriers, government expenditures, monetary policy (inflation), property 
rights, regulation, black market activity, political rights, civil liberties and freedom of press. 
But the problem with many of them are that they are not specific institutions, but explanatory 
variables and outcomes of good institutions. The quality of many institutions are also 
correlated, which makes it difficult to identify which institutions that matter most and which 
are substitutes for each other in spurring growth (Todaro & Smith, 2009). 
 
Some scholars argue that democracy is the most effective way to develop good institutions. A 
large literature however, only finds an ambiguous relationship between democracy and 
growth (Shirley, 2005, p. 627) and show that democracies on an average do not outperform 
autocracies. Almeida and Ferreira (2002) argue that the reason some democracies grow 
significantly better than autocracies is because of the greater volatility for autocracies caused 
by the tendency to be outliers, showing much better or much worse growth performance than 
democracies caused by much better or much worse policy choices. Democracies do better on 
other measurers than autocracies, but not on economic growth. It is also worth noting that it 
could be difficult to classify a political system as democratic or autocratic. Informal 
institutions could also influence the functioning of democracies. Keefer (2007) finds that 
especially young democracies are prone to clientelism, a system were politicians rather than 
taking positions on policy issues or provision of public goods, exchange goods and provide 
services in exchange for political support. Despite poor government performance, they avoid 
being thrown out of office due to their mutually beneficial relationship with a solid base of 
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clients, who at the same time are depended on their patron to be able to keep their privileges. 
Democracies could also be undermined by a lack of trust in the culture where mistrust hinders 
the citizen’s from cooperating in monitoring the government (Shirley, 2005). India has been 
highlighted as a fully democratic country where the citizens has not been able to overcome 
collective action problems and thus, getting a more well-functioning government. 
 
4.5.5 How can poorer countries attain well-functioning institutions? 
Institutional reforms are also difficult. According to Douglas North, formal rules “may be 
changed overnight, the informal rules usually change only ever so gradually”(North, 2008). 
Generally, poor institutions have proved to be very resistant to reforms, and this helps clarify 
why development is so challenging. But development is not impossible. Recent successful 
stories indicate that development is not inevitable despite poverty traps and numerous failures. 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009). There are multiple paths to economic development. Every 
developing country must find its own path to effective economic and social institutions 
(Rodrik, 2005). There is no unique link between the functions that good institutions perform 
and which form such an institution should take. The important first order economic principles: 
Protection of property rights, contract enforcement, market-based competition, appropriate 
incentives, sound money, debt sustainability, does not map into unique policy packages. 
These principles need to be packed into institutional design which are sensitive to local 
constraints and additionally can take advantage of local opportunities. Good institutions are 
those that deliver these principles in an effective way. Furthermore, countries with success are 
those that have used this room wisely (Rodrik, 2005). Institutions itself is a strong competitive 
advantage and nowhere is this point more clear, than in emerging economies where the 
institutional frameworks differ greatly from those in developed economies (Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). 
Outsiders have changed deeply rooted institutions, usually by revolutions or invasions, 
sometimes in consort with a local powerful reformer (Shirley, 2005). Well-known examples 
of this is Napoleons enduring changes to Europe’s institutions in a relatively short period of 
occupation. Nevertheless, force alone cannot explain that the changes occurred, the countries 
intellectuals were at the same time receptive to Napoleon’s innovations. Powerful elites who 
welcomed foreign ideas also led major institutional changes in a short amount of time, such as 
Tsar Peter the Great in Russia or Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey. Shirley (2005) suggests 
that aid is a poor tool to change the beliefs and norms that underlie many institutions, because 
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most institutional changes are well beyond the time frame of most aid projects. Institutional 
change also requires alterations in beliefs that cannot be easily pushed or purchased by 
outsiders. Successful institutional adaptions have been engineered by insiders and sometimes 
work quite contrary to the conventional wisdom of best practice touted by the aid community. 
Furthermore, aid in the absence of a supportive institutional framework could even hinder 
reform by creating perverse incentives and help keeping rulers who are opponents, not 
catalysts of reform, in power. 
 
New Institutional Economics have not produced a full answer to those questions asked. 
Historical analysis has produced several explanations but no single argument is fully 
satisfactory. The quality of many institutions is correlated and it is disputed which of them 
that matter most and which are substitutes for each other in spurring growth (Todaro & Smith, 
2009). While much is known about the institutional development in Western Europe, more 
research is needed on the development of institutions in developing countries (Shirley, 2005). 
Moreover, igniting economic growth and sustaining it are somehow different. Igniting 
economic growth generally requires a limited range of reforms. Sustaining economic growth 
however, is in many ways a harder challenge and requires construction of a sound institutional 





Chapter 5 Data and Methodology 
The purpose of research is the production of new knowledge about a certain phenomenon 
using scientific methods. Scientific methods are a system of explicit rules and procedures 
which the research is based on (Jacobsen, 2005). These rules and procedures provide 
researchers the opportunity to communicate, to criticize, and to make scientific progress. 
Without following these rules, the research will have very limited value. 
”The scientific method is the way researchers go about using knowledge and evidence to 
reach objective conclusions about the real world” (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2013, p. 
6) 
In this chapter I will explain my foundation of the methods chosen and I will present my 
research objective. According to Jacobsen (2005), the research process consists of six stages, 
and I will go through each step in addition to presenting my choice of variables for the data 
analysis, presenting the case-study and discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen 
methods. 
5.1 The development of the research question 
The problem definition is according to Jacobsen (2005) three-parted. First one must define the 
wanted research units, then define how to measure the specific phenomena by chosen 
variables and at last decide the context and the precise setting. As explained in the 
introduction, this thesis aims to answer why some countries succeed in achieving sustainable 
economic growth, while others do not, by focusing on the Emerging Markets. I will try to find 
what factors and institutions are essential for establishing long-term economic growth. Which 
factors has helped them grow and which factors would help them achieve sustainable long-
term economic growth? I will also look more deeply into three of the major Emerging 
Markets; China, India and Brazil. Which factors and institutions has helped them grow, what 
factors and institutions would help them or what will hinder them continue growing into high-
income economies?  
Research Questions 
1) Which factors are essential for improving a country’s growth environment and for 
establishing long-term economic growth? 
2) What are the main institutions of China, India and Brazil and their main drivers and 
hindrances for achieving sustainable growth? 
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5.2 Research design 
The research design represents the framework for the study as a guide in collecting and 
analyzing data. There is no standard or correct research design, but the type of research design 
should be consistent with the purpose of the research. The fundamental objective of the 
research can be classified as exploratory, descriptive or causal (Jacobsen, 2005). 
In an exploratory study the primary aim is to get ideas, insight and understanding of the 
phenomenon being studied. More precise exploratory design seeks to identify the problem 
(including research problem), pinpoint the problem and formulate options / hypotheses (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). Exploratory design can also contribute to answer research 
questions or could be an early part of the research process. Exploratory research is well suited 
with quantitative research methods and include literature search, experience surveys, focus 
groups, and case studies with analysis of selected cases. I use exploratory research in this 
thesis to get knowledge of the relevant theories and in the qualitative part when I am studying 
China, India and Brazil. The flexibility, time and openness made the exploratory design most 
suitable for this. 
Descriptive research requires a substantial knowledge on the topic which is studied. The 
research will also present a clear answer to the research question. 
Casual research tries to identify relations and cause-effect relations between variables. In 
social science this is defined as “If X occurs, there is a given probability for Y to occur”. 
(Jacobsen, 2005). We can infer causality in four ways; Concomitant variation implies that X 
and Y occur or vary together in the way predicted by the hypothesis. This is of course not 
enough to prove the hypothesis. Time order makes causality more likely if the occurrence of a 
causal factor precedes or at least is simultaneous with the occurrence of the effect. 
Elimination of other possible factors with control variables or moderating variables, 
combined with theoretical support also infers causality (Jacobsen, 2005). 
Causal design is the chosen design for the quantitative research where I want to see which 
factors that has had a significant impact on the economic growth in the Emerging Markets. 
5.3 Methods 
Research methods are classified as either quantitative or qualitative depending on which data 
collection methods are used and what the purpose of the research is. The research method 
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should be based on the research question and to what extent the method can be used to answer 
the phenomenon being studied (Yin, 2013). 
Quantitative research methods explore “research objectives through empirical assessments 
that involve numerical measurements and analysis approaches“ (Zikmund et al., 2013, p. 
134). Quantitative research emphasize amount and use numbers instead of words and is often 
based on large samples and enables the results to be generalized in much greater extent. 
However quantitative research methods offer little depth and is considered superficial, less 
flexible, and there will be much information and nuances which is difficult to visualize. 
Quantitative research is structured and normally provides categories while qualitative research 
is more adaptable and has free forms (Jacobsen, 2005) 
Qualitative research is often meant to describe a situation or phenomenon in depth and is 
often based on smaller samples. You can visualize information and nuances which you are not 
able to do with quantitative methods. A major limitation and consequence of the depth and 
elaboration combined with smaller samples is that it reduces possibilities for generalization. 
The researcher is also often involved in both data collection and the statistical analysis. A 
consequence is that the qualitative research is more researcher-dependent and subjective 
compared to quantitative research (Jacobsen, 2005). Qualitative research can accomplish what 
quantitative research cannot and the other way around. Therefore, I will analyze cross-country 
data first, and supplement it with a case study on China, India and Brazil afterwards. 
5.4 Data collection 
Primary data is data collected for a specific research. Given the nature and topic of this thesis, 
and in addition to cost and time, I will base my research on secondary data. Secondary data is 
data that are not directly assembled fort the purpose of the given project (Hair et al., 1998). 
The advantage of secondary data is that it is fast available, given it the fact that it is already 
gathered. In this thesis I use secondary data from the World Banks data of World 
Development Indicators  (The World Bank, 2016b) and Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(The World Bank Development Research Group, 2015) as well as educational data collected 
from Barro and Lee (2013). 
5.5 Unit selection 




Emerging Markets are countries that are neither part of the least developed countries, nor of 
the newly industrialized countries. An emerging market is a market big enough to count in the 
world economy or global politics, in terms of sizeable populations in combination with 
sizeable economic activity, but at the same without high enough income-levels to count as a 
developed market. Emerging Markets are in a transitional phase with rapid GDP growth as 
well as in a process towards rule of law and towards institutional credibility, but still with 
economic and political instabilities and weak institutional infrastructure. 
5.6. Statistical analyses 
The statistical analyses are conducted in IBM SPSS 22 and will be conducted as correlational 
analyses. 
Covariance and the correlation are the two key measures to discuss associations between two 
variables (Schuetz, 2011). Covariance is the degree to which variables vary together. 
Correlation (r2) is a measure of how strongly two variables relate to each other. The most 
common way to check correlation between variables is Pearson’s correlation, often referred to 
as Pearson’s r which measure the linear relationship between the two variables (Field, 2013). 
The Pearson correlation is calculated as follows (Schuetz, 2011, p. 87): 
  
Bivariate correlation shows the variables’ independent relationships. Values range from -1 
(perfect negative correlation) to +1 (perfect correlation), and 0 (no correlation between 
variables). Pearson’s r will never be exactly 0 or 1 and there is no definitive answer on what is 
a strong correlation, but in social science ±0,2 is considered a weak correlation, ±0,3 to ±0,4 
as a moderate correlation and over ±0,5 is considered as a strong correlation (Johannessen, 
Tufte, & Christoffersen, 2016). 
When two or more independent predictors are highly correlated with each other, it is known 
as multicollinearity. Multicollinearity indicates that two variables may be measuring the same 
ting, rather than being related. Problems with multicollinearity exists if Pearson’s r are higher 
than 0,7. One solution may be to eliminate one of the variables, another solution is to combine 
them or to use the model only for prediction purposes (Hinton, McMurray, & Brownlow, 
2014). Large intercorrelations between independent variables should be noted, since that 
correlation can substantially affect the results of the analysis. 
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In social science analyzes, the most common levels of significance are at 1 percent, 5 percent 
or 10 per cent. The level of significance determines when we will accept our hypotheses or 
when we will reject them. The analysis in chapter 6 has a significance level of 5 percent, 
meaning that we can with 95 percent security prove a relation between the variables included 
in the analysis. With such a low number of countries analyzed, it can be accepted with a high 
level of significance. At 10 percent significance level, it could be possible to discuss and see 
trends, but we cannot reject hypotheses based on this level. 
 
5.6.1 Variables 
Dependent variable – Economic growth 
GDP at Purchase Power Parities (PPP) or Market Exchange Rates (MER)? 
In economic terms, development has been measured as the capacity of a national economy to 
generate and sustain an annual increase in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). “GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars.” (The World Bank, 2016a). The economic well-
being of a country’s population, is normally measured in GDP per capita. To take into account 
a country’s ability to expand its output at a faster rate than the growth of its population, 
economic growth is commonly measured as the increase of its value of inflation - adjusted 
(real) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Todaro & Smith, 2009). 
When undertaking a multi-country analysis in different currencies, either Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPP) or Market Exchange Rates (MER) could be used in the analytical framework. 
Market Exchange Rates balance the demand and supply for international currencies, while 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates capture the differences between the cost of a 
given bundle of goods and services in different countries. According to PWC (2015), GDP at 
Market Exchange Rates is considered a better measure of the relative size of the economies 
from a business perspective. MERs is also a more precise measurement, since PPP is a 
relatively sensitive measure which depends on the required quality on data of the relative cost 
of local goods, services and inflation rates. Research also indicates that the use of MER or 
PPP data itself, does not lead to different results or conclusions (PWC, 2015). 
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Average Real Growth GDP per capita pro anno %. 
Definition: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is gross 
domestic product divided by midyear population(The World Bank, 2016b). 
Independent variables 
The independent variables draw primarily on the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database and consists of 23 different variables that has been found to have a 
significant and relatively robust effect on economic growth in various cross-country growth 
regressions. Their main reference is Robert Barro’s influential research (Barro, 1996). All 
these variables are also available for most countries and updated on a regular basis. Most of 
the data are collected from the World Banks data of World Development Indicators  (The 
World Bank, 2016b) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (The World Bank Development 
Research Group, 2015). Additionally, data on education are collected from Barro and Lee 
(2013). 
I will study these relations in a cross-country statistical analysis for the period between 1990-
2015. This period is chosen because the underlying theory relates to long-term growth and 
checking for relationships at the annual frequency would be dominated by large variations and 
measurement error. Terms like trade and inflation, vary over time within countries. Also, 
some of the variations, like fertility, life expectancy and education are not measured in many 
countries at shorter periods than 5 or 10 years. This suggests a focus on the determination of 
growth rates over long intervals. Some instruments are earlier values of the repressors due to 
the relation between growth rates and prior values to the explanatory variables. Emerging 
economies have stronger potential growth than today’s developed economies on most of these 
measures, however not all countries may be able to sustain this in the long-run. 
See appendix for chosen variables. 
5.7 Institutional analysis 
In addition to the data analysis I have also included a comparative case study of China, India 
and Brazil and their institutions. A case study is a comprehensive and detailed study that 
focus on one or very few units and are characterized by limited opportunities for (statistical) 
generalization. In a case study there should not only be presented descriptions; theory 
application is also very important to carry out a good case study (Jacobsen, 2005). 
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5.8 Strengths and weaknesses of chosen methods - Validity and reliability 
When conducting research, it is important to consider validity and reliability of the findings. 
“Good measures should be both consistent and accurate” (Zikmund et al., 2013, p. 303). 
Validity is synonymous with accuracy or correctness and is the extent to which a 
measurement is capable of measuring what is intended to measure. Our aim is that differences 
in scores truly reflect differences among the countries on the characteristics that we seek to 
measure, instead that they are the result of constant or random errors (Jacobsen, 2005; 
Saunders, 2011). The literature describes different types of validity: Internal validity is only 
present if the independent variable is responsible for the observed variance in the dependent 
variable. External validity is a measure of the extent which we can generalize the findings to 
apply for the rest of the population (Jacobsen, 2005; Saunders, 2011). 
Reliability is concerned with consistent findings and the degree that similar results could be 
found in other studies with independent, but comparable measures of the same object. The 
reliability increases if similar studies could be conducted and still give the same results. The 
results should be possible for others to try and verify (Saunders, 2011). 
Given that I have based my research on publicly available data and economic growth theory, I 
suggest that my findings are quite reliable. However, given the small sample of countries, and 
since I only have analyzed data from fast-growing developing countries during the last 25 
years, it will be difficult to generalize the findings to other developing countries outside of the 
sample in the quantitative findings. Other results could have been produced, if I had included 
countries without significant economic growth during the last 25 years. Many of the 
independent variables could influence economic growth, even if it they not were statistically 
significant in this study on which factors that influenced which countries that experienced 
most economic growth during the last 25 years. Based on my empirical evidence I can only 
conclude on which factors that have correlated with the economic growth in these countries 
and why some of them have grown faster than the other countries in the same sample. A 
significant effect in this sample shows the factors that separates the fastest growing Emerging 
Markets from the rest. On the quantitative part, given the small sample, the results could be 
very sensible. Generalization could also be a problem and the results will most likely only be 
valid for fast-growing economies like the countries in the sample.  The data we have collected 
only covers 25 emerging markets. If we had included countries with zero or negative 
economic growth, other variables could have shown statistical significance.  
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Since economic growth is most likely not only affected by one simple factor, but by multiple 
factors that interact, it makes the identification of causal relations between variables more 
difficult to prove. If one variable changes before a growth spurt, it could be one of the causes 
for the following growth spurt, but if the change happens during or after the growth spurt, it 
could have been the variable itself that have been affected by the growth spurt. Strong 
economic growth could for example affect the fertility rates, but also the other way around. 
Stronger institutions could also be affected by the income-levels since countries with higher 
income could afford building better and more stable institutions than low-income countries.  
 
When searching for information you must be critical concerning the sources used. Most of my 
qualitative data is based on highly recognized academic sources, and highlights likely reasons 
for differences in economic growth between Brazil, China and India. The quality of the 
conclusions in the comparative analysis is dependent on the quality of the analysis of the 
individual countries. If these analyses are not valid, the similarities and differences that create 
the foundation for the conclusions will be flawed as well. The analysis is based on qualitative 
data from a wide range of sources including books, economic journals and documents from 
independent NGOs. The qualitative data are also supported by statistics. You could however 




Chapter 6 Data analyses, results and discussion of findings 
Research question:  
Which factors are essential for improving a countries growth environment and for 
establishing long-term economic growth? 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
   
Table 6.1: Mean scores and standard deviations for all variables 
From the table, we can see that the country with the strongest institutions, South Africa, is the 
country with the weakest economic growth. While the country with the weakest institutions, 
Iraq, has experienced considerable economic growth (6% on a yearly average). The country 
with the strongest economic growth for the past 25 years, China, scores lowest on political 
rights for their citizens in terms of voice and accountability. 
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6.2 Correlation analysis - Pearson correlation: 
6.2.1 Collinearity 
If two or more predictor variables in the multiple regression are highly correlated, it will be 
difficult to separate out what each variable explains (Saunders, 2011). To investigate whether 
there are problems with multicollinearity, a correlation analysis between the variables is 
performed. The Pearson correlation coefficient (r) works as a measure of how much the scores 
of the two variables vary together and then contrasts this with how much they vary on their 
own. The joint variability is referred to as the sums of products and will be the largest when 
high values of one variable are matched with high values of the second variable. It will be a 
negative value when the correlation is negative. If the joint variability matches the individual 
variation in the scores, then these values will be equal, so one divided by the other will result 
in r = 1 (or -1 if the sums of products is negative). If there is no joint variability the scores do 
not correlate at all and r will be zero. This is based on the assumption that the relationship 
between the variables is linear (Field, 2013). The table on the next page is a correlation matrix 
of all the variables. Each pair of variables is correlated and the results placed in the table, 
presents details of the Pearson correlation r value, probability value and number of units in 
the sample. Problems with multicollinearity exists if Pearson’s r is higher than 0,7 
(Johannessen et al., 2016). Multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power or the 
reliability of the model, but may not give valid result for the independent variables. If some of 
the variables with multicollinearity turns out the be statistically significant for the dependent 
variable, some of them should be removed or added together with the other variables in case 
of a later multiple regression.  
The analysis shows that some of the variables on institutional quality are highly correlated 
with each other; Government effectiveness is highly correlated with Regulatory Quality, Rule 
of Law and Control of Corruption. Regulatory Quality is highly correlated with Rule of Law 
and Control of Corruption. Rule of Law is highly correlated with Control of Corruption. Other 
findings include that the 1989 Fertility Rates is highly negatively correlated with the 1989 
Life Expectancy and the 1990 population 15-59. The change in fertility rates are highly 
negatively correlated with the change in population 15-59. 1985 Years of male schooling are 
highly negatively correlated with Government Consumption Ratio and the change in the 
working-age population. The results also indicate that the average inflation rate is highly 
negatively correlated with the 1989 Fertility Rates, a relationship one can suggest as spurious 




Table: 6.2 Pearson correlations 
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6.2.2 Correlation with the dependent variable 
From the table, we can also get an idea of which variables that show a significant correlation 
with the dependent variable. We can see that in this sample the 1990 levels of per capita GDP 
is strongly negatively correlated (p < 0.01) with the average economic growth, and that the 
investment ratio to GDP is strongly positively correlated (p < 0.01) with the average 
economic growth. We can also see significant negative correlations between “Voice and 
Accountability AVG 1996-2015” and the GINI-coefficient (p < 0.05) and the dependent 
variable. 
 
GDP per capita (1990). 
 
Figure 6.1: Scatterplot which shows the relation between GDP per capita 1990 (current 
USD) and average GDP growth 1990-2015 
 
The Pearson’s r for the correlation between the 1990-levels of GDP per capita and economic 
growth is -0,527, which means there is a strong negative relation between this variable and the 
dependent variable. However, we cannot make any other conclusions about this relationship 
based on this number. Since Pearson’s r is negative this means if the independent variable 
increases in value, the dependent variable decreases in value. Since p < 0.01 it is considered 
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strongly statistically significant and shows that a lower starting point in 1990 on GDP per 
capita is associated with higher economic growth for the last 25 years. 
 
Voice and Accountability 
 
Figure 6.2: Scatterplot which shows the relation between average voice and accountability 
1996-2015 and average GDP growth 1990-2015 
 
Given that the Pearson’s r for the correlation between voice and accountability and economic 
growth is -0,419, this means if the independent variable increases in value, the dependent 
variable decreases in value. Since p < 0.05 it is considered statistically significant, the 
findings indicate that the independent and dependent variable are related to each other. 







Figure 6.3: Scatterplot which shows the relation between average GINI-coefficient 1989-2014 
and average GDP growth 1990-2015 
 
Given that the Pearson’s r for the correlation between the GINI-coefficient and the economic 
growth is -0,502, which indicates there is a strong negative correlation between this variable 
and the dependent variable. Since Pearson’s r is negative this means if the independent 
variable increases in value, the dependent variable decreases in value. Since p < 0.05 it is 
considered statistically significant, the independent and dependent variable are related to each 
other. These findings indicate that countries with higher equality (lower GINI-coefficient) 
have experienced more economic growth during the last 25 years than countries with higher 





Investement Ratio to GDP
 
Figure 6.4: Scatterplot which shows the relation between average investment ratio to GDP 
1990-2015 and the average GDP growth 
 
Given that the Pearson’s r for the correlation between the investment ratio to GDP and the 
economic growth and is 0,544. This indicates there is a strong positive correlation between 
this variable and the dependent variable. Since Pearson’s r is positive, this means that if the 
independent variable increases in value, the dependent variable also increases in value. Since 
p < 0.01 it is considered strongly statistically significant, the independent and dependent 
variable are strongly related to each other and shows that countries with higher investment 
ratio has experienced more economic growth during the last 25 years. Among the countries 
with the highest investment ratio’s in the last 25 years we find China and Iran with over 35% 
of GDP, while in the other end with the lowest investment ratio’s we find Nigeria, Brazil, 




6.3 Discussion of findings 
In this subchapter, I will compare my findings to both existing theory and previous research. 
Higher productivity is critical for achieving sustainable economic growth. However, it is not 
known exactly what causes productivity to increase and if it were, economic growth would be 
predictable, achievable and easy to attain (O'Neill, 2011, p. 36). As mentioned in the 
methodology-part, one cannot say exactly what is the cause of economic growth, but it can be 
made more likely by indicating relations between an independent variable and economic 
growth. Since economic growth is most likely not only affected by one simple factor, but by 
multiple factors interacting, it makes the identification of cause and effect relations between 
variables more difficult to prove. The data analysis in this thesis is not strong enough to 
conclude on a causal relation. We can however support earlier research which indicates a 
relation, but more research on that area is needed.  
 
The data analysis suggests a strong negative relation between the 1990-levels of GDP per 
capita and economic growth. This indicate that low starting levels is related to higher 
economic growth. The later a country enters the demographic transition and begins its modern 
economic growth, the shorter time they need to double the input per worker, this is supported 
by the successful development-story of South Korea (see 3.4 Are the living standards 
converging between developing and developed nations?) and feature of the neoclassical 
growth models and their convergence hypothesis, which says that the lower a country’s 
starting level of GDP per capita, the higher predicted growth rate. However, earlier findings 
suggest a tendency of slower economic growth in poorer countries than in richer countries 
during the last 50 years (Todaro & Smith, 2009, pp. 78-81). Our results may have been 
affected by the small sample of developing economies. 
 
The results of the data analysis indicating that low Voice and Accountability is negatively 
associated with Economic growth, supports earlier findings that democracy has little or no 
effect on economic growth. China, Iran, Iraq and Vietnam are among the countries in the 
sample which score lowest on Voice and Accountability, while all except Iran are among the 
five fastest-growing in this sample. The results of the data analysis also suggest that countries 
with higher equality (lower GINI-coefficient) has experienced more economic growth during 
the last 25 years than countries with higher inequality in our sample is consistent with theory 
on inequality. The fact that BRICs have more billionaires than the rest of Europe combined 
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(Forbes, 2016), with less GDP and even less GDP per capita suggest an unhealthy inequality 
in these countries (The World Bank, 2016b). Much of the growth in the other Emerging 
Markets has also gone into the pockets of small groups of elites. Historically, rapid economic 
growth where the elites have benefited most, followed by slowdown or even recession, has 
led to problems like inflation and political and social unrest (Venezuela, Brazil). To avoid 
this, central banks need to be in control of inflation and support policies for a broader sharing 
of the wealth created (O'Neill, 2011). The positive relation between investment ratio to GDP 
and the economic growth finds support in Barro’s model where high investment rates are 
associated with capital accumulation and growth (Barro, 1996). 
Many of the variables highlighted by Barro did not have significant effect in this sample. Due 
to the small sample of countries, I can only conclude on, based on empirical evidence, which 
factors that have correlated with the economic growth in these countries and why some of 
them have grown faster than the other countries in the same sample. A significant effect in 
this sample shows the factors that separates the fastest growing Emerging Markets from the 
rest. Many of the independent variables could influence economic growth, despite the lack of 
statistical significance in this study on factors that have influenced which countries that has 




Chapter 7 China, India and Brazil – Accelerating forces and hindrances of sustainable 
economic growth. Case study and discussion of findings 
Research question: 
What are the main institutions of China, India and Brazil and their main drivers and 
hindrances for achieving sustainable growth? 
In this chapter I will compare China, India and Brazil on important areas for sustainable 
economic growth. I will present the three countries on the areas of their economy and 
economic growth, openness to trade, institutions, demographics and the middle-income trap. 
In the analysis of their institutions, I will look at the three categories for institutions important 
for economic growth highlighted by Rodrik et al. (2004); Shirley (2005). 
The findings are presented separately for each country. Only findings that are viewed as 
relevant to the research question are presented, compared and discussed in this chapter.  
7.1 China, India and Brazil - overview 
China, India and Brazil are the most interesting Emerging Markets due to their large potential, 
massive populations and size. What distinguish these countries from other Emerging Markets 
is their ability to influence the global economy, and also their ability to be influenced by the 
global economy (O’Neill et al., 2005). According to projections by PWC (2015), China, India 
and Brazil will respectively constitute the largest, second largest and the fifth largest 
economies in the world in 2050 in terms of GDP. These three countries are already important 
actors in the global economy and home to about 3 billion people, 40% of the world’s 
population. With these large populations, they will have a decisive impact and are critical for 
the growth in most of the other Emerging Markets and for the rest of the world.  
Despite being the three major Emerging Markets there are few similarities and shared 
characteristics between the three countries. China matters to the two others, but aside from 
that they do not matter so much to each other (O'Neill, 2011). Brazil is at the highest income-
level of the three countries in terms of GDP per capita, but has been a middle-income country 
for decades. China and India, however have gone from being impoverished to experiencing 
major economic growth after institutional market reforms, just in the last decades. India and 
Brazil are multi-ethnic democracies, while China is a homogeneous one-party state. Brazil is 




7.1.1 Avoiding the middle-income trap? 
The goal for all Emerging Markets should be to achieve growth after the economies mature 
and avoiding the middle-income trap. A goal for all Emerging Markets that want to evolve 
into high-income economies should be to follow in in the footsteps of the East Asian tigers; 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. O’Neill et al. (2005) suggests that the key 
to converting potential into reality is to strengthen long-term conditions for growth; 
macroeconomic stability, political institutional development, trade and investment openness 
and education. They also introduce the Growth Environment Score (GES), a ranking system 
which aims to summarize the overall conditions for economic growth. A major goal for 
China, India and Brazil should be to undertake policies to raise their Growth Environment 
Scores to the levels of the East Asian Tigers. Based on O’Neill et al. (2005) and O'Neill 
(2011) I will additionally compare China, India and Brazil with South Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore on the five areas suggested by O’Neill to analyze their long-term conditions for 
growth. Because of lack of reliable data from The World Bank (2016b), Taiwan is excluded. 
See appendix for chosen variables and scores. 
7.2 China 
7.2.1 Economy and economic growth 
From 1978 to 2015, China’s economy grew at an average rate of approximately 9% per year 
(The World Bank, 2016b), an unprecedented achievement for any economy in history. 
Despite the fact that China is the world’s most populous nation, their income per capita in 
2015 was 51 times higher than it was in 1978 (The World Bank, 2016b). China is called the 
greatest success story of our generation and became the second largest economy in the world 
in 2010. Some analysts believe China will become the world’s largest economy and surpass 
the United States in terms of GDP by 2030 (PWC, 2015; Ward, 2012). Despite increased 
income disparities, during the last decades, China has also experienced the most dramatic 
reduction in extreme poverty in world history. Per poverty data from the World Bank, the 
number of poor in China has fallen from 66,6% in 1990 to 1,9% in 2015. This means that over 
700 million fewer people are living in extreme poverty in a span of just over two decades 
(The World DataBank, 2016). Despite that estimates both on current average income levels 
and poverty differs, there is no reason to doubt that China has experienced tremendous 
economic growth and poverty reduction during the last decades. 
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The boom in China was helped by exports and massive growth in investment, but this is 
unlikely to be repeated in upcoming decades (O'Neill, 2011). China’s growth now needs to be 
led by consumption. Fast-growing domestic consumption is seen as a good predictor of 
stability and long-term, economic growth (O'Neill, 2011). According to O'Neill (2011), even 
conservative official Chinese data indicate a rise in personal consumption by $1.5 trillion 
from 2001 to 2011. China is also a major importer, which is the main reason for China’s 
decrease in trade surplus experienced during the last decade (The World Bank, 2016b). The 
story of China’s economic development is no longer just a low-cost labor driven growth; the 
Chinese people are rising the income ladder and associated increased spending. 
7.2.1.1 Openness to trade 
According to data from the Central Intelligence Agency (2016), China is the world’s largest 
exporter with in total 12.8 % of the world’s exports. China however, are vulnerable on their 
exports for economic growth. They have taken advantage of their low-cost labor and 
attracting multinational companies to their country, and exported cheap consumer goods to 
the West, particularly the United States has given China the label as the world’s factory 
(Wilson & Purushothaman, 2006). Their exports, together with investments and favorable 
demographics has been the key to their remarkable rise over the last decades. Back in 2006, 
their exports as percentage of GDP was 35.6%, At the same time China was exporting 12 
percent of its total GDP to the United States (The World Bank, 2016b). This of course, was 
not sustainable, and China was badly hurt by the following downturn and credit crisis in the 
United States and the rest of the world. In the last 10 years, much has changed and China’s 
trade surplus has declined sharply. In 2015 it was only 3.5 percent, down from around 9% in 
2006 and exports accounted for only 22.4 % of its GDP (The World Bank, 2016b).  
China is the largest receiver of foreign direct investments among the major Emerging Markets 
(Bellak et al., 2013) and many large Western multinational companies have made major 
investments in China, among them Apple, General Motors, Motorola and Volkswagen (Hitt & 
Xu, 2015). The Chinese government has also encouraged Chinese companies to move into 
international markets and China has made large investments in other countries, much of these 
investments are in the energy and mineral sectors. More than 75% of these investment are in 
other Asian countries and the Chinese government must approve all major outward Foreign 





For centuries China stood as a leading civilization with major innovations in arts and sciences, 
but by the 19th and 20th century, the country was beset by revolutions, famines, military 
defeats and foreign occupation. After the Chinese civil war, the People’s Republic of China 
was proclaimed in 1949 as a communist autocratic system under leadership by chairman Mao 
Zedong. Under Mao’s rule the government imposed strict controls over all aspects of life and 
his rule costed tens of millions of people their lives. After Mao’s death in 1976, China began 
institutional market reforms in the late 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. 
Institutions forming units of social behavior 
China is quite homogenous, with 92% of their population being Han Chinese. Their official 
language is standard Chinese or Mandarin, despite large varieties within the different Chinese 
languages/dialects. China is officially an atheist country, but their largest religious group is 
Buddhists (18.2%) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). China’s state structure has been 
labeled as “neo-traditionalism” (Walder, 1986). China is organized as a one-party state with 
the Chinese Communist Party controlling decision at all levels, from society-wide to 
workplace. The Chinese society could be viewed as a totalitarian framework that stresses 
positive framework for compliance where public loyalty to the party and their ideology is 
mingled with personal loyalties between party officials and their clients. These arrangements 
can be described as dependence, deference and particularism. However, these arrangements 
are not modern and are a mix of the traditional Chinese Confucian model for patriarchy and 
its complex hierarchy of personal ties, overlaid with the communist model of the unified 
party-state as the focus of interpersonal connections and prescribed duties (Scott, 2002). As 
documented by (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 1991) on cross-cultural differences, Chinese 
respondents expected and accepted more inequality in power than Western respondents. 
Chinese respondents also scored much higher on the collectivist dimension compared to the 
more individualistic Western respondents. “These societal system, beliefs and assumptions 
about the role of the state, the rights of individuals and the nature of authority relations 
provide a divergent base for organizing a society compared to the Western society” (Scott, 
2002, p. 67). The Chinese civilization has survived for thousands of years while they are 
continuing to adapt to changes in the modern world and emphasizes the concept of harmony 
and foster credible commitment through institutional arrangements that promote social 
exchanges (Cao, 2015; Nee & Su, 1996). The Chinese civilizations definitional boundaries 
can also be extend to the extensive settlements of overseas Chinese (Scott, 2002). 
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Institutions that foster efficient economic exchange 
Formal rules are seldom effective without the backing of informal institutional constraints 
(Nee & Su, 1996). Transaction costs are lower in institutional settings where trust and 
cooperation flow from informal norms and established social relationships (Nee & Su, 1996). 
The market-based structures in China are still in development, requiring business actors to 
still use more traditional practices derived from Chinese culture, especially as a mean to doing 
business. A practice known as guanxi is central in Chinese society and can best be described 
as the relationship individuals cultivate with others. These alliances, built over time with 
partners, often by exchanging gifts and services with a norm of trust and reciprocity, are 
almost critical to gaining access to critical resources. In these cases, informal institutions 
serve as substitutes for formal institutions. Since the Chinese government still have control 
over most resources, a strong relationship with government leaders at local and national levels 
has been necessary for successful managers and entrepreneurs. Formulation of policies and 
interpreting and enforcing regulations and policies is more likely to be beneficial with access 
to relationships with the key persons in the government (Hitt & Xu, 2015). Furthermore, since 
the judicial system is not separated from the government, the government entities have a 
major influence on courts and the enforcement of court rulings. Rule of law in China remains 
in an early stage of development with inconsistent enforcement, still making informal 
institutions critical for doing business in China. According to (Batjargal et al., 2013) informal 
institutions at least partially serve as a substitute for weak or underdeveloped formal 
institutions in China. An advantage of weaker formal institutions for Chinese businesses is 
that there exist fewer formal constraints on business activities. They have more easily could 
have entered other Emerging Markets that also have weaker formal institutions. Mostly in 
other Asian countries, their ability to build strong personal relationships fits well with the 
local culture, and these relationships allows them to operate more effectively in these 
advantages compared to many Western firms. Due to strategic alliances with Western firms 
and increased Westernization combined with increased mobility and independence for 
Chinese people, the importance of guanxi has moderately declined because of increased 
availability of resources. However, firms with stronger political connections still enjoy greater 
security and political connections in local and regional are especially important in provinces 




Institutions that protect property and persons 
China consists of 22 provinces (considers Taiwan its 23rd province), as well as 5 autonomous 
regions, 4 municipalities and 2 special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau). All 
the provinces are subservient to the central government but have considerable practical power 
and can be described as federalism with Chinese characteristics (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2016). Institutional evolution has also become a major focus of the Chinese government to 
maintain the economic development. Institutional transitions in political and regulatory 
systems, legal frameworks, and market structures are intended to help Chinese (and foreign 
firms) to operate in a more supportive institutional environment (Hitt, Li, & Worthington, 
2005). Market reforms were implemented in 1992 and in the late 2000s, Chinese firms began 
to be encouraged to make investments in foreign countries. To comply with the requirements 
of the World Trade Organization, new property laws were enacted in the late 1990s and the 
2000s. Significantly important was the new laws and regulations for intellectual property 
protection which provide access to new technologies primarily developed in Western 
countries also enhances innovation and associated economic growth. Allowing Chinese firms 
to develop stronger competitive advantages for competing in the global markets. Additionally, 
changes related to rules of corporate governance, including more insight of the Chinese stock 
market and the companies participating were implemented (Chen, Newburry, & Park, 2009). 
The dramatic economic transformation that China has undergone since the early 1980s, has 
changed China from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy through 
marketization, liberalization and privatization (Hitt & Xu, 2015). The role of political 
institutions in China has changed in the transition from a state socialist redistributive economy 
to a hybrid market economy (Nee & Su, 1996). In the early years of the reforms, the state 
controlled both movement of labor and capital. With China’s development, they have 
witnessed the rise of the local corporatism, a loosely coupled coalition involving local 
government, financial institutions and both collective and state-owned firms. The rise of local 
corporatism has been accompanied a by a gradual, though partial privatization of collective 
and, to a lesser extent, state-owned enterprises. However, the Chinese state has opposed large-
scale formal privatization and still control factor resources. Guanxi-ties with the government 
agencies are still important securing key supplies, such as iron and steel, electricity and other 
commodities controlled by the government. The firms also have no autonomy to determine its 
employment policy. Local governments also provide coordination in helping entrepreneurs 
finding business partners and helping foreign investors and local firms setting up joint-venture 
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projects. Support of local governments are important for most businesses and business deals 
often cannot be consummated without the backing of local government, owing to pervasive 
uncertainties stemming from the institutional environment of only partial reform. (Nee & Su, 
1996). 
The market reforms in China after 1978 has resulted in a shift from the central to local 
government and provided them with incentives to pursue market-oriented growth. Under the 
decentralized system, local government and firms assumed responsibility for their profits and 
losses. In the new system, the firms share its profits with local government per prearranged 
agreements. The profit sharing, the key institutional change that opened the way for informal 
privatization has endowed firms with greater fiscal autonomy and rights over the distribution 
of economic surplus. It encourages management to improve incentives for achieving 
productivity gains for the form. Because local governments depend on industry’s profitability 
as their primary means of increased revenue, they have a strong incentive for achieving gains 
in relative economic performance of the firms. Under the conditions of competitive markets, 
they local government also face hard constraints on the extent to which they can expropriate 
surplus from the local industry (Nee & Su, 1996). Under profit-sharing arrangements, both 
local governments and firms have greater incentive to pursue productivity gains. Profit 
sharing provides local government with an interest in improving infrastructure, both in terms 
of roads, transportation, technology and human capital in terms of health and education. As 
well as maintaining a stable regulatory environment (Nee & Su, 1996). 
7.2.3 Demographics 
China’s economic growth has also been partly attributed to its lower fertility rates. China has 
been the world’s most populous country for centuries. But, in the 1980s China adopted a 
policy of one child per family to achieve their goal of a 1% birth rate during the decade. 
Economic incentives included priority of one-child families in housing, education and 
medical care while mothers of two children or more often were denied promotions as well as 
subject to punishment in terms of fines and lost right to certain privileges. Second births could 
often only be approved if the woman had remarried or if the first child had serious birth 
defects (Todaro & Smith, 2009). Due to these policies and a strong cultural reference for 
boys, China is already experiencing a problem with “missing girls” with a boy to girl ratio of 
118 to 110 on newborns, which is probably a significant measure of the result of sex selection 
technologies. In 2020 expected that they could have as many as 30 million more men than 
women in marriageable age and could lead to social instability. However, the full impact of 
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China’s population policy is still uncertain. Only time will tell if the benefits from reduced 
population growth will be worth the cost of harsh break with traditional family norms (Todaro 
& Smith, 2009). China’s population policies have been viewed as playing a major role in 
improving the quality of life for women, having increased opportunities for education and can 
get better economic opportunities. Reduced fertility rates has also made it possible to invest 
more resources into the children’s future. China’s fertility rates of births per woman, has been 
reduced from 5,7 in 1970, to 3,2 in 1977, to 2,6 in 1988, to 1,5 in 2014, (The World Bank 
Development Research Group, 2015) which means that the fertility rate now is below 
replacement level. China’s population growth rate has slowed dramatically and the population 
is not expected to exceed 1.5 billion before it starts to fall. Estimates suggests that upward to 
250 million people fewer people have been born in China, due to the one-child policy (Todaro 
& Smith, 2009). The success of population control in China has led to some flaws as well. By 
2050, China is expected to have twice as many above 50 than below 20 years. However, 
concerns of an ageing population and to high dependence ratio on the working adults have led 
to the existing law being changed to a two-child policy effective from January 1st, 2016 
(Phillips, 2015). 
Another key to China’s extraordinary growth has been their population shift from rural to 
urban areas. Since the market reforms took place in the late 1970s, millions have moved from 
the countryside to the cities, contributing to and benefiting from China’s transformation into a 
global manufacturer. But, having a large population is not enough, you also need the right 
people. A large working population is the key to increase productivity and achieving 
persistent stronger economic growth (O'Neill, 2011). China’s working population, however, is 
ageing and they may soon have reached their peak, a similar challenge faced by Japan. The 
number of young people are falling drastically, in 2013, only 17.1 percent of China’s 
population were under the age of fourteen, around half the number twenty years ago, while 
10.35 percent of their population were over 65, almost double the numbers twenty years ago 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). However, continuous urbanization could help China that 
still has a big “population reserve” in the countryside with an urban population of 50.6% of 




7.2.4 Are they avoiding the middle-income trap? 
China ranks well on macroeconomic stability, with inflation rates almost as low as Korea and 
Hong Kong, but still much behind the levels of Singapore. As China develops, its government 
probably must allow its currency to fluctuate more and have inflation targeting. China has 
until now, kept its currency artificially stable by purchasing huge amounts of foreign currency 
(O'Neill, 2011). China scores well on macroeconomic conditions with higher investment rates 
than all the East Asian Tigers. A possible interpretation is that China is now building its 
infrastructure, while the East Asian Tigers already has been through this phase. However, 
there is reason to doubt some of the Chinese official data, and many believe they are 
overestimated (O'Neill, 2011). Also, investments should go to the right areas, or else they are 
worthless. Due to poorly developed financial markets makes, for the new class of affluent 
Chinese, property is the best of a limited set of investment choices (O'Neill, 2011). This has 
led to fear of an assets bubble like Japan’s experiences in the early 1990s. To prevent a crash, 
the Chinese government has tried to set restrictions on borrowings and buyers to try to take 
some of the heat out of the market (O'Neill, 2011).  
China’s rankings on technology adoption are mixed compared to the East Asian Tigers. 
Especially their internet usage is still quite low with only 50% of their population having used 
internet during the last 12 months. Cell phone usage is also well behind the developed-
economies level. China’s high growth has been followed by dramatic reductions in poverty, 
and to secure a long-term progress they have made substantial efforts to at least providing 
minimal education and health care for all its citizens (Todaro & Smith, 2009). But, China still 
have very much room for improvement on their human capital variables. Only 3.6% of their 
population aged 25 and above have attained tertiary education. This especially low compared 
to Singapore (37,0%) and South Korea (39,8%). They are even well behind India (9,1%) and 
Brazil (11,3%), despite their China’s advantage with more secondary education and its much 
lower levels of no education, which are almost at the levels of the East Asian Tigers. Their 
life expectancy however, are closing in on the levels of the Asian Tigers. China ranks well on 
political stability, but much improvement is needed on control of corruption and rule of law, 





7.3.1 Economy and economic growth 
India used to serve as a clear example of development strategies gone wrong (Rodrik & 
Subramanian, 2004) and has the lowest levels of GDP per capita among the three major 
Emerging Markets (around 1/5 the levels of China and Brazil) (The World Bank, 2016b). 
However, since the economic liberalization initiated in 1991 towards a free-market economy, 
India has enjoyed a steady average growth rate of around 7% for the last two decades (The 
World Bank, 2016b). India has a fast-growing service sector and the fact that many Indians 
speak English, put them in great position to benefit from the Internet and the boom in 
outsourcing services (O'Neill, 2011). In 2014, India became the world’s fastest growing major 
economy, replacing China (The World Bank, 2016b) in addition to topping the World Bank’s 
growth outlook for the first time in 2016 (2016). Long-term projections are positive for India 
due to young population, investment rates and increasing integration into the world economy 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). India has the potential to surpass Japan and become the 
third largest economy in the world by 2050, based on Goldman Sachs Growth Environment 
Scores (GES), while according to the 2050 scenario presented by (PWC, 2015), India could 
even surpass the United States and become the second largest economy in the world in terms 
of GDP at PPP. 
7.3.1.1 Openness to trade 
India is not as open to international trade as it should be and this has been a long-standing 
problem. Despite being the world’s 7th largest economy in terms of nominal GDP (The World 
Bank, 2016b) India is only the world’s 21st largest exporter, with 1,3 % of world’s exports 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). However, there has been much progress. The economic 
liberalization initiated in India in 1991 towards a free-market economy has helped India 
reintegrating into the world economy (O'Neill, 2011). India’s trade to GDP-ratio has 
improved from 15 percent in 1990 to 48 percent in 2014 (The World Bank, 2016b). 
Moreover, one should recall that Indian exports are rising from a very low base. India can 
trade much more, and more important especially improve its trade with its neighbors, which 
counts the Emerging Markets of Pakistan, Bangladesh and China (O'Neill, 2011). 
Protectionism, especially on agriculture has pushed up prices for Indian customers, without 
offering much improvement back. If they are to continue their economic liberalization, India 
needs to further bring down barriers to imports and foreign direct investment. Strict rules and 
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bureaucracy for trade scare foreign investors off and short-term thinking where fear of losing 
Indian jobs to foreign competition hinders future long-term economic growth. Increasing 
foreign investment would undoubtedly enhance the efficiency and productivity of India’s 
industries (O'Neill, 2011).  
7.3.2 Institutions 
“While the British often invoked history to justify the choices they made, they frequently 
misread history” 
(A. Banerjee & Iyer, 2005, p. 1195) 
The origins of India can be traced back to the Indus Valley civilization, one of the world’s 
oldest civilization during the 3rd and 2nd millennia B.C. and extended into northWestern India. 
The classical Indian culture were created when Aryan tribes infiltrated the Indian 
subcontinent and merged with the earlier Dravidian inhabitants about 1500 BC. India later 
experienced the spread of Islam and invasions from Turko-Mongols, Afghans and Persians. 
The Muslim Mughal Dynasty ruled India for more than the three centuries until Great Britain 
became the dominant political power on the Indian subcontinent (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2016; Ludden, 2013). The driving force behind the expansion of the British empire 
from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries were profit and India was the place 
where the big money was made. The ruthless pursuit for profits transformed the East India 
Company from a commercial enterprise into a political and military power that controlled the 
areas of the Indian sub-continent. By the 1750s the Company had begun to conquer territory 
and establish a network of alliances with local rulers either by cooperation or by force, and by 
1849, Britain had total mastery of the sub-continent. The British ruled India until 1947, when 
the Indian Empire was portioned into India and Pakistan making what were former Indian 
territory into to the modern states of Pakistan and Bangladesh (A. Banerjee & Iyer, 2005). 
In an analysis on the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in India (A. 
Banerjee & Iyer, 2005), has suggested that differences in historical property rights institutions 
has affected the current differences in economic outcomes in India’s current Federal states. 
Britain’s main source of revenue in India was land revenue or land tax. The different British 
administrators could conclude very differently on what land revenue system were used. All 
cultivable land in British India were taxed under one of three alternative systems: 1) a 
landlord-based system, known as zamindari or malguzari, 2) an individual cultivator based 
system (raiyatwari), or 3) a village-based system (mahalwari). (A. Banerjee & Iyer, 2005) 
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found that “areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords had 
significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post-independence period 
than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. These areas also had 
significantly lower investments in health and education. These differences are not driven by 
omitted variables or endogeneity problems; they probably arise because differences in 
historical institutions leading to very different policy choices (A. Banerjee & Iyer, 2005, p. 
1190).”  Despite the fact that the Indian government has been committed to equalizing access 
to social goods, (Abhijit Banerjee, Iyer, & Somanathan, 2005) found enormous variation in 
access to public goods within India and much lower levels of public expenditures in areas 
with a higher proportion of landlord districts. This gap in public investment can be explained 
by lesser health, education and technology investment. Within the state of Andhra Pradesh, 
less than 7% of the villages had middle schools, while 55% un Guntur had one, similar 
variations were also found on access to medical care and infant mortality which were 40 
percent lower in non-landlord districts (A. Banerjee & Iyer, 2005).  
Institutions forming units of social behavior 
It is suggested that homogeneous societies have an advantage because there is more likely 
with contact across the population, building understanding, trust and shared interests (Abhijit 
Banerjee et al., 2005). India has a great linguistic, cultural, religious and ethnic diversity and 
is home to more than two thousand different ethnic groups (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2016). The national Census of India does not recognize racial or ethnic groups within India, 
but it is common to categorize the ethnic groups into two large linguistic groups, Indo-Aryan 
(72%) and Dravidian (25%). The Indian society has traditionally been divided into castes, but 
these categories has no official status since the independence in 1947. Despite that the caste 
system was abolished at their independence in 1947, this system of social stratification is still 
being practiced with widely discrimination against lower castes and is a powerful social 
institution that control parts of the Indian social order (Pruthi, 2004). The largest religious 
groups are Hindus (80.5%) and Muslims (13.4%), but there are also considerable groups of 
Christians (2.3%) and Sikhs (1.9%). Hindi is the most widely spoken language and first 
language to 41% of the people, but there are also 14 other official languages. English enjoys 
the status as the most important language for national, political and commercial 
communication.(Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).  
The British rule in India were built on the principle of division and solidarity among Indians 
were discouraged (Abhijit Banerjee et al., 2005). The British ruled India with the help of local 
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rulers who accepted the British sovereignty in around 560 big and small native states. The 
rulers in these native states were clearly interested in keeping the traditional structures of 
authority which gave greater power to the existing social elites, including the caste system. 
The British rule led to a concentration of power in the metropolitan areas and contributed to 
the creation of a new English-educated Indian elite in these areas, cut off from the rural areas 
where most Indians lived. (Abhijit Banerjee et al., 2005) suggests that caste and religious 
division created conflict that are still an important part of the Indian political landscape. 
India today is a democratic federal union divided into 29 states and 7 union territories (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2016). India is a representative democracy, but democracies could be 
undermined by a lack of trust in the culture where mistrust hinders the citizens from 
cooperating in monitoring the government. Indian society has been called “heterogeneous and 
conflict-ridden” (Shirley, 2005, p. 628) and has been highlighted as a fully democratic 
country where the citizens have not been able to overcome collective action problems to 
getting a more well-functioning government (Shirley, 2005). India’s regions, unlike China are 
very autonomous and its central government cannot dictate policy. India are also, unlike 
China, a democratic country with clashing voices and opinions. India also has the caste 
system, competing faiths and a complicated colonial heritage  and has been highlighted as a 
fully democratic country where the citizens have not been able to overcome collective action 
problems to getting a more well-functioning government (O'Neill, 2011; Shirley, 2005). 
Moreover, it cannot be said that China’s political system is superior to India’s democracy, but 
simply an observation of the differences in implementing economic policies in the two 
countries.  
Institutions that foster efficient economic exchange 
Until 1990, there were strict regulations that discouraged Indian firms from internationalizing. 
Prior to 1991, it was common in the private sector with governmental intervention, control 
and supervision. Foreign firms also faced high barriers for entry by being required to go 
through a number of procedures before even beginning operations in India (Mohan & 
Aggarwal, 1990). However, the economic landscape in India were changed through various 
legal and regulatory reforms starting in 1991, where several sectors were opened and the 
range of foreign activities which Indian firms could be involved in were widened (Stucchi, 
Pedersen, & Kumar, 2015). These institutional changes together with greater access for Indian 
firms to financial markets has supported India’s rapid economic growth (Nayyar, 2008). 
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However, India is well behind China’s on Macroeconomic conditions in terms of investment 
rates. Still, many international companies find investing in India difficult compared to for 
example China. They experience resistance from Indian policymakers and difficulties with the 
sheer number of people it takes to get beyond the system (O'Neill, 2011). For many Indian 
politicians, foreign investment could be viewed as attempt of foreign exploitation. 
Furthermore, it is very difficult to get access to India’s financial system. Indian households 
debt to GDP was 10.3 % in 2016, compared to 33.6% in South Africa, 40.7 % in China, 46% 
in Brazil and 78.4% in the United States and 87.4 % in the United Kingdom (Trading 
Economics, 2016). This is a clear sign that the Indian economy is functioning mostly on cash 
and most Indians lacks access to a Western banking system. India’s credit market is in their 
infancy and they need to develop its financial infrastructure for future economic growth. India 
is also the major Emerging Market with least foreign direct investment (The World Bank, 
2016b). Big deals can get done in India, but it takes time. The government makes it difficult 
even if they, in theory allow it. With a friendlier environment for foreign investment, this rate 
would grow sharply (O'Neill, 2011).  
Institutions that protect property and persons 
After two decades of economic liberalization and democratic decentralization, political and 
bureaucratically corruption has not disappeared in India. (Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 
1993) has suggested that decentralization could promote cost-effectiveness, improved 
accountability and reduced corruption and making local politicians and elected councilors 
more effective and being more accountable to the local community than distant civil servants 
and auditors. Moreover, empirical studies from India has suggested that resistance within the 
bureaucracy can hinder and distort effective democratic decentralization (Jayalakshmi, 2000) 
and that effective decentralization also depends on the strength of the local communities 
affected (Alsop, Krishna, & Sjoblom, 2001). (Véron, Williams, Corbridge, & Srivastava, 
2006) also found that political support in the form of a strong pro-poor government in power 
at the center, is crucial for reducing risk of capture from elites of decentralized state 
institutions. The findings of (Véron et al., 2006) on democratic decentralization in Eastern 
India found extensive use of public office for private gain. The programs of decentralization 
of government programs were followed by decentralization of corruption and made local 
councilors virtually unaccountable to the community, political parties or the development 
administration. Even if politicians and elected officials were up for re-election, they 
compensated for political uncertainty by building up a capital stake through corruption. Other 
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critical studies on Indian institutions revealed fundamental weaknesses of many local 
community institutions divided along the line of class, gender and ethnicity and that in many 
cases that rent-seeking increased under the economic liberalization (Dirks, 2011).   
7.3.3 Demographics 
“Everything is growing faster in China than India, except for the population” 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009, p. 310) 
India’s population reached 1 billion in year 2000, a tripling of their population at their 
independence as a nation in 1947. India is also projected to surpass China as the world’s most 
populous country, and is by 2050 expected to surpass China’s population by 200 million 
people. Even though half a century ago, India had well under two-thirds of China’s population 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009) 
India implemented a national family-planning program in 1949, as the first country in the 
world. Despite this, family planning in India very relatively ineffective and by the 1970s, 
India’s extremely high population growth was considered out of control. However, after India 
during the last decades has experienced rising income levels both for the middle class and 
improved conditions among their significant fraction of poor, fertility rates have fallen. 
India’s fertility rates have fallen from 5,03 births per woman in 1977, to 4,04 in 1990, down 
to 2,4 in 2014 (The World Bank, 2016b). Life expectancy at birth has in the same period risen 
from 52,3 years in 1977 to 68,0 years in 2014. With falling fertility rates and the development 
of a preference for boys over girls, India has, experienced a “missing women” problem 
parallel to China’s. In the more affluent states of India, per data from National Family Health 
Survey, the sex ratio at birth is almost 130 boys per 100 girls. Such a dramatic imbalance 
could likely be a cause of future social stress. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in district 
with higher poverty levels the female disadvantage in child survival is significantly lower 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009).  
The economic growth rates experienced in India since the 1980s has partly been attributed to 
its moderate decline in fertility (Todaro & Smith, 2009). Lower fertility rates in India, has 
been followed by increased female literacy and given greater opportunities for women to 
complete higher education. Improvement of the human capital in the population has in turn 
led to improved economic conditions. Falling or delayed fertility rates are essential for India’s 
future development and continued economic success (Todaro & Smith, 2009). 
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India’s demographics are viewed as the most favorable in the world, 46.6% of their 
population is 24 years and younger, while only 5.8% of their population is 65 years and older 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). India’s population was 1.25 billion in 2013 (The World 
Bank, 2016b), and it could reach 1.7 billion by 2050 (O'Neill, 2011), 10 to 20 percent more 
than China and with a much larger group of young people. India could end up with a labor 
force almost as large as China and the United States combined.  
7.3.4 Are they avoiding the middle-income trap? 
India scores relatively well on macroeconomic stability in terms of inflation compared to 
other developing countries but still have around twice the average inflation rates of Hong 
Kong and Korea and almost four times compared to Singapore. India needs inflation targeting 
to achieve more inflation stability. India has very poor growth scores on technological 
capabilities, with only 26% of their population having used internet for the last 12 months and 
much lower scores on cell phone usage than the other major Emerging Markets and the East 
Asian Tigers. As mentioned in 7.3.2.2 India lags on their investment ratio. India also has poor 
growth scores on human capital and especially on education. “At the top end of its 
educational system, India produces large numbers of well trained, English-speaking technical 
graduates, who have driven the success of its service industries who also are highly 
computer-literate” (O'Neill, 2011, p. 74).  However, hundreds of millions of Indians remains 
uneducated with little or no formal education and limited access to technology. As one can 
see from the table, 42,3% of India’s population over 25 has no schooling at all (Barro & Lee, 
2013). There is also a wide gender disparity, with women being behind both on education and 
literacy where about only half of the female population can read and write. However, there 
has been a 11,8% growth in female literacy rates between 2001-2011, which means the 
gender gap appears to be narrowing (UNICEF, 2015). Compared to the East Asian Tigers 
(and China and Brazil on all levels except tertiary education), India struggles at all levels of 
education, from primary through tertiary. However, the Indian government has promised to 
make large investments at every level of education, they are forced to do so simply to meet 
domestic demand for an educated workforce. India needs investment in education and 
technology to evolve (O'Neill, 2011) . India’s life expectancy is 68 years and the lowest 
among the largest Emerging Markets, over 14 years behind all the East Asian Tigers. 
Improvements are needed on their health conditions to close in the gap to the other countries. 
India’s institutions score very low on political stability and absence of violence, also 
compared to Brazil and China. They score relatively better on rule of law compared to the 
72 
 
two-other major Emerging Markets, but still have much improvement to achieve compared to 
the East Asian Tigers, especially Hong Kong and China. India also scores low on corruption 
and have much room for improvement on that area as well (The World Bank Development 
Research Group, 2015). 
7.4 Brazil 
7.4.1 Economy and economic growth 
Because of its rich resource base, Brazil’s economy grew at around 6 percent each year for 
decades (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). By 1965, Brazil was one of the wealthiest developing 
countries in the world and continued to grow until 1978 when it reached 5,500 per capita. 
Then Brazil entered a stage of stagnation and decline and did not regain its 1978-levels until a 
brief period in 1995. First in 2006 Brazil once again surpassed its 1978 levels and did in other 
words spend nearly 30 years without economic growth (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). According to 
statistics from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Brazil had in 2015 the largest 
economy in Latin America as well as the ninth largest economy in the world (down from 
seventh place in 2014) . From 2000 up to 2012, Brazil was one of the fastest-growing major 
economies in the world, with an average annual GDP growth rate of over 5%, with its 
economy in 2012 temporarily surpassing that of the United Kingdom. The economic growth 
has however decelerated and Brazil had almost no liquid growth in 2013 and 2014, while the 
economy shrunk by -3.8 % in 2015. According to the IMF, their GDP is expected to shrink by 
additional -3.5% in 2016 with outlook to no additional growth in 2017 . 
Brazil was previously a large importer of oil and imports accounted for more than 70% of the 
country’s oil needs, but after gigantic oil and gas-findings outside their coast, Brazil became 
self-sufficient in 2006-2007. Brazil is now the world’s largest offshore market, larger than the 
Gulf of Mexico and Norway combined, and is estimated to have the 15th largest oil and gas 
reserves in the world as of 2014 (2014). Petroleum and oil consisted in total 10 % of Brazil’s 
total exports in 2012 (2013).  Brazil has however, as well as the other oil exporting countries, 
Venezuela and Russia been among the economies in the world with largest negative economic 
growth since the decline in oil prices in 2014 (International Monetary Fund, 2015c). 
 
7.4.1.1 Openness to trade 
In contrast to the export-led strategies of the East Asian Tigers, the Brazilian government 
encouraged domestic firms to serve the local markets through import-substitution policies. 
73 
 
Due to centuries of colonial history when raw materials served foreign interests, exporting 
was associated with backwardness. The consequence of this was that the Brazilian 
government focused on protecting their domestic industry instead of encouraging them to 
compete in the global market (Moreira, 1995 cited in Mudambi 2015). This is clearly shown 
by the fact that trade only counts for 25% of Brazil’s GDP, while the corresponding number 
of another major Emerging Market, China is 45% (The World Bank, 2016b). However, it 
would be meaningless to compare them in to the East Asian Tigers in terms of share as a 
percentage of GDP, due to the major differences in size of domestic markets. But, there exists 
a stark difference between the Brazil and the governments of the East Asian Tigers in terms of 
systematic planning. While for example South Korea maintained a consistent and pro-active 
policy over five decades where the goal always has been to increase its international 
competitiveness through technological efforts, the Brazilian government has not implemented 
any systematic industrial policy. Brazil’s policy has mainly been driven by external shocks, 
and its policy has been emergent and reactive instead of a result of systematic planning 
(Mudambi, 2015). In contrast to the East Asian mindset to become global, Brazilian 
companies have generated a comfortable performance solely based on their domestic market 
and their large domestic market may also have given them a sense of security. A consequence 
of this is that we observe few global corporate champions in the Brazilian economy 
(Mudambi, 2015). The policies of the Brazilian government have been aimed at import-
substitution rather than promotion of exports and it also lacked consistency and continuity 
because it varied from government to government. Brazil’s so-called “Target Plans” have 
neither been specified in detail nor been accompanied by any significant institutional changes. 
The actual intervention to support the development of heavy industries in Brazil, with public 




The Brazilian institutions and its lack of quality has deep roots in the colonization process. 
Between 1500 and 1822, Brazil was a colony of Portugal and the Portuguese rule was 
characterized by systematic exploitation of Brazil as a source of economic rent. The quality of 
the institutions in Brazil is found to vary by the different regions and these differences can be 
traced back to the colonial days under the Portuguese state when the institutions were built 
upon either sugar-cane plantations or gold mining (Naritomi, Soares, & Assuncão, 2007; 
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Simonsen, 1937 (1977 English version)). These are regarded as the most important extractive 
activities developed by Portugal and marked the initial occupation of important areas of the 
country. 
 
The sugar production took place mainly along the Northeastern coast (Simonsen, 1937 (1977 
English version)). Until the 17th century, Brazil was the main world producer of sugar and 
economy of sugar was based on the plantation system which contained three important 
elements: “Latifundo” (a large estate of land with a single owner), the monoculture and slave 
based labor. Sugar production brought the patriarchal and slavery-based society to Brazil 
(Higman, 2000). The extractive occupation of this part of Brazil had “all the elements 
comprising poor institutional foundations: extreme social inequality, very small economic and 
political elites with concentrated powers, and establishment of legal and tax systems shaped 
almost exclusively around extractive goals”. (Naritomi et al., 2007). Municipalities with 
origins back to the gold mining expansion is located in the central part of Brazil (Fausto, 
2006). The Portuguese crown tried to keep as much control and scrutiny as possible. This led 
to an environment of a constant race between individuals and state where the miners tried to 
avoid the hand of the Portuguese crown, while the state created increasingly oppressive 
devices to regulate and control production even further. The natural development was the 
creation of very heavy and ineffective institutions and an extremely hostile environment and a 
constant struggle between the state and the civil society (Fausto, 2006). The characteristics of 
ineffective functioning of the government and a culture of detachment between population 
and state has possibly spread to other regions of Brazil as well (Naritomi et al., 2007). The 
findings reported by (Naritomi et al., 2007) suggested that that the institutions built during the 
gold-cycle are characterized by even worse governance practices and less access to justice 
than institutions built during the sugar-cycle days. The quality of the institutions were 
measured on four dimensions: distribution of economic power through distribution of 
endowments, persistence of political power, quality of local government practices and access 
to the legal system (Naritomi et al., 2007) 
 
Institutions forming units of social behavior 
Brazilians is not a homogeneous group. 48 % of the country’s population is white and 
descend from European immigrants. Pardos (multiracial) comprise 43% of the total 
population and are a mixture of Europeans, Blacks and Amerindians. 7.5 % of the population 
is black, and are mainly descended from African slaves that were imported from the late 
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1500s to the 1860s when Brazil were consistently the largest destination for African slaves on 
the American continent. Brazil also has smaller groups of Asian (1%) and Amerindians 
(0.5%) (Telles, 2014a). The Brazilian society is largely hierarchical and the economic growth 
in Brazil has not been followed by poverty-reduction at the same scale as witnessed in China 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009). Despite having a large middle-class, poverty and income inequality 
levels remain high (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). Brazil has one of the highest Gini 
coefficients in the world, 52.9, compared to Norway which has a score of 25.9 (The World 
Bank, 2016b). The social differences in the country, mostly follows the ethnic groups and 
non-whites are almost absent in the Brazilian middle class and above (Telles, 2014b). The 
differences between the socio-economic groups are also shown in education where whites are 
seven times more likely to complete college, than non-whites (Do Nascimento & Nascimento, 
2001). Extremely high economic inequality and social division is viewed as a threat for 
further progress in Brazil (Todaro & Smith, 2009). 
 
Institutions that foster efficient economic exchange 
Brazil is a market economy, but with a complex formal law and inconsistent legal and 
regulatory framework (Stone, Levy, & Paredes, 1996). With a number of inconsistent laws 
regulating otherwise simple business transactions, (Williamson, 1990) describe “jeito” (the 
fix) as a way around formal law for achieving simplicity. This can be achieved by private 
citizens with bribes or other services to a properly motivated government official. The 
“despachante” describes a more professional form, which enabled “businesses to proceed 
somewhat logically in an formal environment hostile to efficiency” (Stone et al., 1996, p. 
101). Even if this institutions are more costly than a more rational formal legal system, (Karst 
& Rosenn, 1975) suggests that this gives Brazilian businesses stability and predictability. 
(Harriss, Hunter, & Lewis, 2003) argue that since the non-whites in Brazil mostly has been 
excluded from higher education and economic opportunities, there has developed a culture 
among its citizens that undermine the basis for effective cooperation and the general 
willingness to honor contracts and refrain from corrupt or criminal behavior. Colonialism 
created racist discrimination and exclusion which has been inherited by those in power 




Institutions that protect property and persons 
Even if all Brazilian business operate under a handicap of an inefficient system their 
institutional failures have created fixed entry and other costs that offer advantages to size and 
reputation. (Stone et al., 1996) suggests a trust between legal institutions and profitable public 
and private “insiders”, while limiting the entry and growth of “outsiders” who lack “access to 
such privileged relationships” (Stone et al., 1996, p. 102). A system where influence and 
contacts with bureaucrats are almost vital to economic success indicates a need for legal and 
regulatory reform to promote economic development. (Stone et al., 1996) also found the 
differences between formal law and how it is practiced in Brazil created an inferior 
environment for business in Brazil when comparing to Chile. They also found that the federal 
government economic policy imposed a great insecurity on property rights and that defects 
directly tied to the formal legal system emerged as binding constraints on business. 
Corruption is a major problem in the Brazilian society. The Brazilians lack trust in its 
government and per Transparency Internationals global corruption barometer, the Brazilian 
people views most of its institutions as corrupt (2016). The institutions that are perceived to 
be most affected by corruption are its political parties which 81% of the population view as 
corrupt/extremely corrupt as well as their parliament and legislature (72%) followed by the 
police (70%) (2013). 
 
7.4.3 Demographics 
Brazil has experienced rapid fertility decline since the 1960s and is now below replacement-
level (The World Bank, 2016b). Currently 22,79% of their population is under 15 years while 
8,06% of their population is 65 years and over. Brazil, however has not taken full advantage 
of its large working-age population to develop its human capital and strengthen its social and 
economic institutions and is now facing an aging population. The current favorable age 
structure is estimated to begin to shift around 2025 and fast-paced demographic transition will 
begin with a shrinking labor force and the elderly starting to compose an increasing share of 
the total population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). 
 
7.4.4 Are they avoiding the middle-income trap? 
“Brazil is a country of the future – and always will be” 
- Brazilian joke (quoted by Todaro & Smith, 2009, p. 28)   
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In terms of Macroeconomic stability, inflation is a major problem for Brazil and they have 
experienced decades of hyper-inflation. But in 1999, a formal target for inflation was 
introduced under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (O'Neill, 2011). Since then then 
Brazils inflation has stabilized and Brazil has experienced an average inflation of 6.6% since 
1999 (The World Bank, 2016b). Despite having a little gap behind the East Asian Tigers, this 
a major improvement compared to earlier decades. In terms of macroeconomic conditions 
measured by investment rates Brazil scores low, both compared to China and India and the 
East Asian Tigers. From a Foreign Direct Investment however, Brazil is viewed as the easiest 
of the major Emerging Markets (O'Neill, 2011). They are more Western and democratic than 
India and China, in addition to better established domestic capital markets. Brazils scores 
better on technological capabilities than China and India, but are well behind the levels of the 
East Asian Tigers, especially on internet usage where only 59% of their population has used 
internet for the last 12 months. 
In terms of human capital, Brazil has much improvement needed on educational levels, both 
on average schooling as well as completed tertiary education, especially compared to South 
Kore and Singapore (Barro & Lee, 2015). Studies show that non-whites have a lower rate of 
schooling, a higher likelihood of falling behind in school and at the same time attend schools 
that offer fewer classroom hours than what is the case with whites (do Valle Silva & 
Hasenbalg, 1999). Whites are at the same time, seven times more likely to complete college, 
than non-whites. The reason for that is that there is a racial segregation in Brazil’s educational 
system on the primary and secondary level. While non-white children mostly go to 
underfinanced public schools, the more economically privileged white children are attending 
private schools. The public primary and secondary schools mostly fail in preparing their 
students for entrance examinations for the best universities while the white students have a 
much better chance of mastering the entrance examinations. This results in elite-universities 
that are disproportionately attended by white students. This pattern of racial segregation is 
found in most other parts of Latin America as well (Do Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001). 
Brazil however, has higher life expectancy than India, but are below China and are more than 
eight years below the life expectancy in all the East Asian Tigers (The World Bank, 2016b). 
Brazil is considered the most political stable of the major Emerging Markets. They score 
better on control of corruption than India and China, but India is better on rule of law (The 
World Bank Development Research Group, 2015). Brazil has much room for improvement to 
reach the levels of the East Asian Tigers, especially Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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7.5 Discussion of findings 
In the qualitative part, generalization is not possible, but theoretical contexts could be 
highlighted. Only historical transactions can be examined with security. What happens in the 
future is always a cause of uncertainty. Therefore, it is important to have a clear distinction 
between potential and reality. We cannot say that China and India will become the world’s 
two largest economies in 2050, we can however indicate that this could be achieved in the 
future base on their potential.  
There are multiple paths to economic development. Every developing country must find its 
own path to effective economic and social institutions. Usually it is not enough with a straight 
forward copy of best-practice institutions and it is difficult to find a unique link between the 
functions that good institutions perform and which form such an institution take. The 
important first order economic principles: Protection of property rights, contract enforcement, 
market-based competition, appropriate incentives, sound money and debt sustainability need 
to be packed into institutional design which are sensitive to local constraints and additionally 
can take advantage of local opportunities. Good institutions are those that deliver these 
principles in an effective way. Furthermore, countries with success are those that have used 
this room wisely (Rodrik, 2005).  
China, India and Brazil are very different countries and to find a common way for them for 
achieving sustainable economic growth and to overcome the middle-income trap is difficult. 
As highlighted earlier both India and Brazil are multi-ethnic, while China is mostly ethnically 
homogeneous (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). In African countries as well as in other 
parts of the world, ethnic diversity has been associated with slower growth (Todaro & Smith, 
2009). Collective institutions are important for achieving prosperity and both India and Brazil 
lack a basis for cooperation. They are both democratic countries, but democracies could also 
be undermined by a lack of trust in the culture where mistrust hinders the citizen’s from 
cooperating in monitoring the government (Shirley, 2005). It is also worth noting that India 
and Brazil has inherited institutions that were promoted by outsiders due to their former status 
as colonies under Great Britain and Portugal. 
China is the greatest success story of our generation. Their tremendous transformation during 
the last 30 years, inspires other emerging markets, partly backed by the fact that China 
became the second largest economy in the world in 2010 and some analysts believe China 
will surpass the United States GDP by 2030, and become the world’s largest economy (in 
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terms of nominal GDP, in terms of PPP China surpassed the United States by 2014). 
Furthermore, comparisons between China in 2016 and Japan in the early 1990s has been 
made. Back then, analysists predicted it was only a matter of time before Japan overtook the 
United States place as the largest economy in the world (O'Neill, 2011). Short time after 
Japan’s so-called “Lost decade” (also called “Lost 20 Years”) began with the collapse in 
property prices and investments caused by a major asset price bubble which Japan still 
struggle with consequences from (Funabashi & Kushner, 2015; Hayashi & Prescott, 2002). 
Japan’s low birth rates coupled with almost non-existing immigration led to population 
stagnation and less people to fuel economic growth. Despite fast-rising asset values in China 
and talk of China becoming the world’s largest economy, a major difference between China 
today and Japan in the 1990s is that China still have room to grow. Hundreds of millions of 
people on the Chinese countryside have yet to become part of the economic transformation in 
the country, China also have a long way to go before they settle for the mature, Western 
steady-state growth rate of around 2.5 per cent. According to Goldman Sachs (O'Neill, 2011) 
model for BRIC growth to 2050, China will experience average 5.5 per cent over the period, 
despite declining to 3.5 per cent average growth in the final decade. Other differences 
between China and Japan in the 80s is their level of outwardness. Japan is a more formal and 
closed society than China (O'Neill, 2011). Other languages than Japanese are hardly used in 
Japan, while many Chinese speak English or are acquiring the skill. 
China’s willingness to let provinces and local governments experiment with different 
economic rules and competition if the dominance of the communist party went unchallenged 
has been suggested as a good fit to local institutions. Capitalist incentives have flourished 
within an at least officially socialist system. China’s federal system has been suggested by as 
a cause of their economic growth due to the experimentation permitted among provinces with 
incentives that give rise to rapid gains in productivity in a state with unrestrained capacity to 
intervene and appropriate economic surplus (Weingast, 1993). However, the Chinese “market 
preserving federalism” (Shirley, 2005, p. 630) has also had disadvantages because of struggles 
with corruption and also leaving large parts of the country behind (Shirley, 2005). Chinas 
federalist framework is unable to specify the institutional constraints that limit government 
officials rent seeking behavior and their ability to expropriate economic surplus (Nee & Su, 
1996). Also, Argentina’s travel from a developed country to an underdeveloped today has 
been partly attributed to its federal system (Shirley, 2005).  
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The Chinese civilization has survived for thousands of years while they are continuing to 
adapt to changes in the modern world and emphasizes the concept of harmony and foster 
credible commitment through institutional arrangements that promote social exchanges (Cao, 
2015; Nee & Su, 1996). China’s future, however is also dependent on external factors outside 
the control of the Chinese communist party. China are vulnerable on their exports for 
economic growth. However, in the Western world and especially in the United States, China’s 
exports have been blamed for the loss of Western jobs and support for increased 
protectionism has been popular among supporters of the new President-elect of the United 
States, Donald J. Trump (Trump, 2016). If the United States one day threatens to ban Chinese 
goods, Chinas strong economic growth could face difficulties, however due to China’s large 
imports this can go both ways. 
Indian society has been called “heterogeneous and conflict-ridden” (Shirley, 2005, p. 628) and 
has been highlighted as a fully democratic country where the citizens have not been able to 
overcome collective action problems to getting a more well-functioning government (Shirley, 
2005). A clear example is that India prices water and electricity below operating cost causing 
inadequate resources for maintaining the services or providing access to the poor. Even 
though everyone loses from frequent disruptions in services the political opposition to 
reducing these popular but economically disastrous subsidies has been poor (Shirley, 2005). 
India scores relatively well in terms of rule of law and inflation, but quite poorly in terms of 
levels of secondary education, technology adoption and openness. India has the lowest growth 
environment scores among the large Emerging Markets (O'Neill, 2011). Despite a credible 
legal system, India is dominated by the difficulties of bureaucracy for getting things done and 
its scale of poverty. Stagnation of the middle class and growing concentration of income has 
been seen as a source of the middle-income trap (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). Large parts of the 
Indian population living on the countryside and in slums still lack access to health care, 
education, banking facilities with minimal future economic prospects (O'Neill, 2011). 
India has opened up by gradually lowering its very high trade barriers and boosting exports 
(Goldman Sachs, 2007). Increased competition from imports has made domestic firms more 
efficient to survive. With more entry of foreign banks and opening of financial sector will also 
boost economic growth. Improved infrastructure would not happen overnight, but have 
potential for productivity gains and the effect to the economy is substantial (Goldman Sachs, 
2007). India is also going into the great migration period earlier experienced by China and 
witness rapid urbanization. The implications for productivity growth are significant. 
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“A government strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is also strong 
enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens.”(Weingast, 1995). A critical role for political 
institutions is to provide appropriate foundations for economic policy making and securing 
economic and property rights (Weingast, 1995). India is a federalist state and a specific form 
of federalism, called market-preserving federalism is characterized by the limited degree that 
country’s political system could encroach upon its markets. To be successful, federalism 
requires self-enforcing restrictions who make it in the interest of national political actors to 
honor them. In a case study of market-preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995) highlighted 
India together with Argentina and Brazil as a de jure federal system but not a market-
preserving federal system. In India, the political authority of the national government 
compromised the independence of local authority. (Weingast, 1995) also suggested that 
limited government appeared to be an important component of economic reform.  
(Keefer & Knack, 2008) has suggested income equality and education as development 
promoting norms, which both India and Brazil struggles with. Most Latin American countries, 
Brazil included, has failed to make the transition from resource-driven growth driven by low-
cost labor to productivity-driven growth driven by specialization and innovation. (O'Neill, 
2011) suggests one common variable to be more supportive to future economic growth than 
any other, technology. New developments in communication is the leader in this new phase of 
globalization where national economic borders are being eroded and makes it easier to 
participate in global business and markets. (Todaro & Smith, 2009, pp. 310-312)   
Demographic advantage is a condition, but strengthening of key long-term conditions are 
needed to reach their potential (O’Neill et al., 2005). There are also views that they are failing 
to justify the predictions that they would dominate the 21th century. Brazil has fallen into 
recession, partly because of their unhealthy dependence on oil exports. China, the principal 
engine of world growth, has meanwhile seen a sharp contraction in their overall economic 
activity. Meanwhile, India has experienced relative progress and their government are trying 
to open to an array of improvement measures that should help the economy achieve 







Chapter 8 Conclusions 
The rapid economic growth of the emerging markets is the most important economic 
development affecting the world’s population in the first decade of the 21st century, and it has 
lifted millions of households out of poverty. The story of the Emerging Markets is still only at 
the beginning. Some countries will deliver better than projected, while others will fail and 
“New Emergers” will also come into prominence. It is likely that countries with favorable 
demographics has an advantage, nevertheless a great potential for future economic growth is 
not a guarantee for future economic success, Russia and Brazil are clear examples example. 
Sustainable economic growth requires investments in infrastructure as well as improving 
political, economic, legal and social institutions. It also requires a remaining free flow of 
technology, ideas and talented people who are the real key drives of economic catch up 
growth (PWC, 2015). A threat to economic development is if open boarders are being closed. 
(Ward, 2012). A wave of protectionism would hardly benefit any individual economy and 
certainly not the world. Bad politics is a key risk to future growth predictions as well as wars, 
both civil and external. An overdependence on natural resources could also be worsening 
conditions for achieving sustainable long-term growth (Russia, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, 
Nigeria), unless they can diversify their economies. 
The current gap between todays developed economies and the emerging in terms of GDP per 
capita is too large to fully bridge in the upcoming decades. Many Emerging Markets will also 
have difficulties to maintain the growth rates they have experienced during the last two 
decades. The existing developed markets in North America and Europe + Japan will remain 
very significant players in the global economy and politics. Their average income levels will 
remain much higher than even the best-performing emerging markets, despite that their 
growth rates will be relatively low (PWC, 2015). The developed markets offer investors lower 
risk rates due to their institutional and political strengths compared to developing economies. 
A major change of today’s economic order might seem unthinkable, but such large shifts has 
been common in history and prosperity today is no guarantee for prosperity tomorrow. Any 
projections are a subject to many uncertainties and despite their growth potential, the 





8.1 Conclusion of the quantitative research 
In the quantitative research, the results of the data analysis suggested significant negative 
relations between the 1990 levels of GDP per capita, “Voice and Accountability AVG 1996-
2015” and the GINI-coefficient and the average economic growth. The results also suggested 
a significant positive correlation between the investment ratio to GDP and the average 
economic growth. However, this analysis is not strong enough to generalize or to conclude on 
a cause and effect relation. We can however support earlier research which indicates a 
relation, but more research on this area is needed. 
 
8.2 Conclusion of the qualitative research 
China, India and Brazil all belong to the top half of the growth environment scores for 
developing countries, but for all the three major Emerging Markets, there are a large 
distinction between their potential and the reality. 
China has come a long way in the last three decades. From an economy barely registered in 
the global rankings to being the second-largest economy in the world, and possibly being the 
largest one in a few years possibly. However, major institutional development is still needed 
for further economic development and to reach this goal. China has a good growth 
environment; stable inflation rate, investment levels, openness to foreign trade. However, falls 
behind on the use of technology in some areas and corruption. China has the best GES-scores 
of the three major Emerging Market, but improvement is needed to reach developed countries 
levels. China could also experience problems with an ageing population, “China may get old 
before it gets rich” (Goldman Sachs, 2007). However, they have now eased on one-child 
policy. Also, the rapid buildup of human capital combined with continued release of surplus 
labor from agriculture could mitigate the negative influences of an ageing population. China 
has had remarkable improvement in human capital since the liberalization began but there is 
still room for much improvement in tertiary education. However, with a large enrollment on 
secondary education, a solid base for higher education is founded. 
For India to have any change to reach its remarkable potential, they need to increase its 
educational standards and opportunities. India’s poorest and people in remote areas need 
access to education and basic technology. Access to technology like internet and mobile 
phones in combination with education. Only 31.3% of India’s total population are urban 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2016), and added with continued rapid urbanization, it is easy 
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imagine India keeping growth rate above China for the upcoming decades as well. However, 
failure to continue investing in education and technology combined with protectionism could 
leave them back before the economic liberalization reforms in 1991 (O'Neill, 2011). Extreme 
income disparities also undermine social stability and solidarity. High inequality facilitates 
rent seeking (corruption) where resources are diverted from productive purposes that could 
increase economic growth. A reduction in mass poverty is also suggested as a powerful 
incentive for widespread participation in economic development (Todaro & Smith, 2009). 
India can become an engine for the global economy. Long term projections are of course 
subject to a great deal of uncertainty and their growth transition will most likely experience 
some failures. India is viewed as being fifteen to twenty years behind China, especially on 
areas like infrastructure (O'Neill, 2011). India will remain a low-income country for decades, 
with per-capita levels well below China and Brazil, but if they fulfill its growth potential they 
will be a key contributor to the world economy. This is also convenient with the findings and 
conclusion of (Goldman Sachs, 2007). It is also worth noting that in PWCs predictions, the 
growth in both India and China will moderate after 2020 as they mature (PWC, 2015). The 
growth rates experienced during the last years is difficult to maintain (the middle-income trap: 
See chapter 4). Any such long-term growth predictions are also subject to many uncertainties. 
Brazil is considered the most political stable of the major Emerging Markets. They also score 
well on life expectancy and technology adaption; despite that they have some improvement to 
do before they are on the levels of the East Asian Tigers. On the other hand, Brazil scores low 
on investment and education levels as well as openness to trade. It is worth noting that trade 
count for only 25% of their GDP (The World Bank, 2016b), which is remarkably low 
compared to China (45%) and India (48%). However, it is meaningless to compare their 
levels of trade with the East Asian Tiger due to their differing sizes of domestic markets. 
Brazil also have a high percentage of its population in poverty compared to other middle-
income countries. Brazil is also of special interest regarding the middle-income trap, because 
they were richer than the East Asian Tigers back in the 1980s. Brazil has had a larger role for 
state-owned enterprises, much lower education as well as other investments and much higher 
inflation compared to the East Asian Tigers. Brazil has extremely high economic inequality 
and a social division which pose a serious threat to further progress. Brazil has experienced 
economic growth, but limited social progress (Todaro & Smith, 2009). Their current ongoing 
recession and political chaos is reaffirming the impression of Brazil as a country that has 
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failed to make the transition from resource-driven growth to productivity-driven growth 
driven by specialization and innovation (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). 
To meet the challenge of development, countries need an institutional framework that 
supports a market economy and long-term sustainable economic growth is dependent on a 
society with a sustainable basis for investment and development. Markets with a dominance 
of a formal economic structure like prevalence of rule of law, institutions and transparency 
tend to outperform comparable informal economies in the long run. As supported by the 
findings, China, India and Brazil all lack efficient formal institutions, but at some degree their 
informal institutions give them stability and sustainability. Igniting economic growth and 
sustaining it are somehow different. Igniting economic growth generally requires a limited 
range of reforms. Sustaining economic growth however, is in many ways a harder challenge 
and requires construction of a sound institutional fundament to maintain productive dynamism 
and to create resilience to shocks (Rodrik, 2005). Classification by income does not 
necessarily reflect development status, the classification is just as important in terms of 
growth potential. Not all countries at the same income level experience the similar 
development. The refinement is done generally based on their size and growth, as well as their 
growth potential. To live up to their potential for China, India and Brazil, institutional reforms 
are needed. There are still much they can undertake to speed economic and social progress 
even further, but the transition towards a developed economy is by no means assured for any 
of them (Gaeta, 2012b).  
Furthermore, New Institutional Economics have not produced a full answer to the question 
asked. Historical analysis has produced several explanations, but no single argument is fully 
satisfactory. The quality of many institutions is correlated and it is disputed which of them 
that matter most and which that are substitutes for each other in spurring growth (Todaro & 
Smith, 2009). While much is known about the institutional development in Western Europe, 
more research is needed on the development of institutions in developing countries (Shirley, 
2005). 
8.3 Policy recommendations 
China has already taken the most important step by easing on the one-child policy (Phillips, 




For India, despite its large potential, it is critical for them to have “inclusive growth” with 
employment and educational opportunities for all, not increased income inequality. India 
should also decrease their protectionism. Most importantly, India needs to educate its children 
and youth (especially women). The demographic advantage may be lost if they fail to educate 
its people (Goldman Sachs, 2007).  
For Brazil, there is a problem for their future economic growth that they invest to little. To 
improve on this area, their government should address this issue in a similar way as the 
Chinese government. The Brazilian economy should also be more opened to trade. Brazil 
must also improve the overall quality of education and implement structural reforms to 
improve their institutions. This is a view that is consistent with (Goldman Sachs, 2007)  
The goal for all Emerging Markets should be to still achieve growth after the economies 
mature and avoiding the middle-income trap. Following a transition like the Asian Tigers into 
developed economies. To evolve further from the middle-income trap and into being 
innovative economies with a firmer foothold in the major knowledge intensive industries, 
policy changes are needed: The governments should be determined by increasing the 
competitiveness of specific industries. They should identify and invest in industries that are 
suited to their different stages of development and where they could have comparative 
advantages. Above all this, they need to focus on building institutions for development of 
human capital. Sustainable growth is not possible without focusing on building a good 
infrastructure for science and technology which is achieved with a strong education system 
(Mudambi, 2015). 
8.4 Limitations 
I acknowledge there are some limitations to my study. In this paragraph, I will address some 
of these and discuss their impact on the results. 
In the quantitative part, I have not checked for control variables in the data analysis. There 
could be other variables that were not core in this study, that could potentially influence the 
independent variable. Also, as mentioned earlier when discussing reliability, given the small 
sample of countries, and since I only have analyzed data from fast-growing developing 
countries during the last 25 years, it will be difficult to generalize the findings to other 
developing countries outside of the samples, in the quantitative findings. Other results could 
have been produced, if I had included countries without significant economic growth during 
the last 25 years. Many of the independent variables could influence economic growth, even if 
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it they not were statistically significant in this study on which factors that influenced which 
countries that experienced most economic growth during the last 25 years. Based on my 
empirical evidence I can only conclude on which factors that have correlated with the 
economic growth in these countries and why some of them have grown faster than the other 
countries in the same sample. A significant effect in this sample shows the factors that 
separates the fastest growing Emerging Markets from the rest. On the quantitative part, given 
the small sample, the results could be very sensible. Generalization could also be a problem 
and the results will most likely only be valid for fast-growing economies like the countries in 
the sample.  The data we have collected only covers 25 emerging markets. If we had included 
countries with zero or negative economic growth, other variables could have shown statistical 
significance. The research conducted in the data analysis in this thesis is not strong enough to 
conclude on a cause and effect relation.  
Due to the nature of this thesis, I have not been able to go deeply into each country in the 
case-study part on China, India and Brazil. More deep investigations are needed, especially on 
the institutions to highlight theoretical context. It is difficult to conclude on definite answers 
to the questions asked. Historical analysis has produced several explanations but no single 
argument is fully satisfactory. We can however support earlier research which indicates a 
relation, but more research on this area of economic growth in Emerging Markets is needed. 
8.5 Prospects for future research 
Intensify and extend the study that has been performed in this thesis, with continued focus 
on China, India and Brazil. In this thesis, I have not been able to go deeply into each country, 
but only touched the surface. Future research could especially investigate more deeply the 
institutions that have formed each country and culture. Another field is the effects of income 
inequality on the different country’s economic growth. 
Seek to generalize and empirically establish more of the suggested relationships between 
independent variables and economic growth. As mentioned in the methodology-part, the small 
sample of countries and the fact that it only includes developing countries with fast-growth 
for the last 25 years makes the results difficult to generalize. A larger and more varied sample 
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Appendix 2: Table: Collection of data for the data analysis 









Appendix 3: chosen variables for data analysis: 
My choice of explanatory variables, based on (Barro, 1996): 
Initial Level of GDP per capita 1990. 
I. GDP per capita (current US$): 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in current 
U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year 
official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect 
the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion 
factor is used. Argentina, Iran, Venezuela lacks numbers for 2015. I will instead use 2014 for 
Argentina and Iran, and 2013 for Venezuela. 
 
Initial GDP, Size of Economy in 1990 
I. GDP, (current international $) 
Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic 
currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official 
exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange 
transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. Argentina, Iran, Venezuela lacks 
numbers for 2015. I will instead use 2014 for Argentina and Iran, and 2013 for Venezuela. 
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators, AVG 1996-2015  
The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators are a research dataset summarizing the 
views on the quality of governance provided by many enterprise, citizen and expert survey 
respondents in industrial and developing countries. Data are gathered from several survey 
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and 
private sector firms. The project constructs aggregate indicators of six broad dimensions of 
governance: The estimates of governance ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance. I will convert this scale into a scale from 0 (weak) to 1 
(strong) governance performance. Both methodology and results are not uncontested, but they 
provide a valuable benchmark to access quality of the regulatory and administrative 
institutions in the Emerging Markets (Gaeta, 2012b). 
 
I. Voice and Accountability 
The variable reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can participate in 
selecting their government, including freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. 
II. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
Stable political regimes promote confidence, which is linked to higher investment and growth. 
It is the government that provides the appropriate framework for economic growth and 
development. The variable measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability 
and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. 
III. Government Effectiveness 
The variable reflects perceptions of the quality of public services and the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures. 
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IV. Regulatory Quality 
The variable reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
 
V. Rule of Law 
The variable reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
VI. Control of Corruption 
Corruption – increased corruption is harmful to economic growth through distorting 
incentives. The variable reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of 
the state by elites and private interests. 
Average CPI inflation rate, average annual 1990-2015 (% year) 
Measured by the consumer price index reflecting the annual percentage change in the cost to 
the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
Higher inflation goes along with a lower rate of economic growth. Inflation discourages 
investment and erodes growth performance. (Barro, 1996) suggests that a greater Central 
Bank independence leads to lower average rates of money growth and inflation and to greater 
monetary stability. This increases price stability and is associated with low and stable 
inflation.  
Fertility rates (births per woman) 1990 and change between 1990-2015 
Represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the 
end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates 
of the specified year. 
Life expectancy at birth 1990 and change during the period 1990-2015 
The basic measure of health conditions. Higher life expectancy has been shown to be strongly 
associated with growth performance. Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a 
newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to 
stay the same throughout its life. According to (Barro, 1996), results are similar if the infant 
mortality rates is used instead as measure of health status 
Levels of human capital 1985 and change during the period 1985-2010 
Educational Attainment for Male Population, 1985-2010 
Education is given big importance in Barros’ model and a country’s ability to adapting to the 
world’s given technology or push the technological frontiers is depending on its levels of 
education. The focus on average years of schooling for the male population aged 25 and 
above is not a perfect tool since it does not show the quality of education, but is shown to be 
well correlated with time spent at school.(Ward, 2012). Additional results also indicate that 
female schooling has importance in relation to reducing fertility and infant mortality and also 
gives slight evidence that female education spur economic growth. (Barro, 1996) 
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Government consumption, ratio to GDP. Average 1990-2015 
Measure includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services It 
also includes most expenditures on national defense and security. In Barros’ original model 




Measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households 
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Thus, a Gini index of 0 
represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Converted to 
scale from 0 to 1 in this relation-testing. 
Investment to GDP ratio of GDP 
Consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the 
level of inventories. High investment rates are associated with capital accumulation and 
growth. The reason investment spending is used as test variable instead of savings ratio, is 
that there is no guarantee it will be used in your own country (capital flight). 
 
Growth in labour force of working age, rate of working age population (15-59) 
Ratio of working population in the total population 
The ratio of people older than 15 or younger than 59, to the working-age population. Data are 
shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population. 
Increase of people in the production line is associated with increase in economic growth. 
When there are many “producers” and few “dependents” who burden the producers like tax 
payments that go to support the elderly and young. Demographics could explain part of what 
is likely to be huge differences in economic performance in upcoming years. However, 
population growth is not itself enough to guarantee growth because without the right 
“economic infrastructure” little progress is made despite growth in the working population 
(Barro, 1996). 
Variable Description Source 
GDP growth 1990-2015 GDP per capita growth (annual %). 
Average 1990-2015 
World Development Indicators, 
the World Bank 
 
Initial Level of GDP per 
capita 1990. 
 
GDP per capita (current US$) 
 
World Development Indicators, 
the World Bank 
Initial GDP, Size of 
Economy in 1990 
GDP (current US$) World Development Indicators, 
the World Bank 
Voice and Accountability Average 1996-2015 Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, the World Bank 
Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
Average 1996-2015 Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, the World Bank 
Government Effectiveness Average 1996-2015 Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, the World Bank 
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Regulatory Quality Average 1996-2015 Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, the World Bank 
Rule of Law Average 1996-2015 Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, the World Bank 
Control of Corruption Average 1996-2015 Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, the World Bank 
Inflation rate: CPI inflation (% year) 
Average 1990-2015 
World Development Indicators, 
the World Bank 
Fertility rates 1989 and change between 1989-2014 World Development Indicators, 
the World Bank 
Life expectancy 1989 and change between 1989-2014 World Development Indicators, 
the World Bank 
Initial level of Human 
Capital 
Average years of male schooling, 1985 
and change in years between 1985-2010 
(Barro & Lee, 2013) 
Government consumption % of GDP World Development Indicators, 
the World Bank 
GINI Index Gini coefficient average 1989-2014 World Development Indicators, 
the World Bank 
Investment ratio to GDP Average 1990-2015 World Development Indicators, 
the World Bank 
Labor force of working 
age, % of total population 
1990 and change between 1990-2015 World Population Prospects, 
United Nations  
 
Table: Chosen variables for data analysis   
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Appendix 4: Determinants of Growth Environment Scores and table with scores 
GES can be divided into five basic areas (O’Neill et al., 2005): 
Macroeconomic stability  
Inflation – higher inflation goes along with a lower rate of economic growth. Inflation 
discourages investment and erodes growth performance 
Macroeconomic conditions  
Investment spending – high investment rates encourage capital accumulation and growth 
Openness of the economy –Economies with high degree of economic openness tend to show 
higher economic growth than less open comparable economies. However, as large countries 
tend to be less open because their large internal markets serve as substitutes for international 
market, this relationship should be adjusted for population and geographical area variables. 
This also highlights how large countries can produce much more of what they need 
domestically.  
Technological capabilities 
Use of mobile telephones – Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 people. Proxied 
by mobile phone penetration as part of the technological capabilities group. The use of 
technology is linked to educational attainment and leads to faster productivity gains. For 
developing countries mobile phones may be the most significant as mobile phones are having 
an increasingly important effect on growth. 
Use of the internet – People who have used internet per 100 people in the last 12 months. (The 
World Bank, 2016b) 
Human capital – (Barro & Lee, 2013);  
Education – Education is perhaps the most important variable in driving the working 
population to higher productivity. 
Life expectancy – the basic measure of health conditions. Higher life expectancy has been 
shown to be strongly associated with growth performance. 
Political stability –  
Political stability - Stability of government – stable political regimes promote confidence, 
which is linked to higher investment and growth. It is the government that provides the 
appropriate framework for economic growth and development. 
Rule of law – well-defined property rights and generally, well-functioning institutions are 
believed to be conducive to higher investment and growth. For investors, there still exists a 
varying degree of uncertainty to invest in an emerging market, even if most emerging markets 
are regulated on paper. Because these regulations suffer from unpredictability as well as the 
lack of an organized institutional framework to implement laws and rules that protect their 
businesses from possible repatriation of funds. A following issue, is that prevailing behavior 
patterns and some cultural norms at the same time are not aligned with legislation which is 
often just only seen as a recommendation instead of an objective book of rules. To live up to 




Corruption – increased corruption is harmful to economic growth through distorting 
incentives  (The World Bank Development Research Group, 2015). 
 
 




Appendix 5: Reflective note 
Over the last months I have worked on my master thesis regarding accelerating forces and 
hindrances of sustainable economic growth in Emerging Markets. The questions I sought 
answered were 1) Which factors are essential for improving a country’s growth environment 
and for establishing long-term economic growth? 2) What are the main institutions of China, 
India and Brazil and their main drivers and hindrances for achieving sustainable growth? 
The reason that additional research on the so-called “Emerging Markets” is a relevant topic is 
because there has been a change in the global economic landscape where the Emerging 
Markets have gone from being only a minor player a few decades ago to now dominating the 
world economic growth. Analysts are already talking about a new economic world order with 
the Emerging Markets dominating the world economy in the future. However, my findings 
indicate that there is a huge difference between their potential and the reality. There will take 
a long time before most of them even could be near as wealthy as the countries of the 
developed world. A common factor for most Emerging Markets is that they struggle with 
institutional weakness on key areas like rule of law, governance and economic freedom. 
Growth and economic success is the consequence of decent economic framework conditions 
and to live up to their potential, reforms are needed in most Emerging Markets. 
Over the next three paragraphs, I will discuss my thesis and my learning outcome over the last 
five years with the three cornerstones of School of Business and Law; Internationalization, 
Innovation and Responsibility 
Internationalization 
For many Norwegians “Internationalization” has been associated with going to Sweden or 
Denmark to buy cheap groceries and alcohol as well as vacationing in an unspecific area 
around the Mediterranean Sea called “Syden”. However, Norway is just a small country with 
5 million people, and in this era of globalization we are influenced by events outside of our 
country every day. International issues affect us more than we realize. How much of our 
personal belongings are developed and produced in Norway? Almost none I would think. We 
are connected to the rest of the world constantly, and Norway is not an isolated island. We are 
also not just influenced by the rest of the Western world, Norwegian companies trade with 
and operate on a daily business with China, South Korea, Singapore, Nigeria and almost every 
country in the world. To understand a complex world, you need knowledge about main issues 
like history, economy, development and politics. A master’s degree in Business 
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Administration gives you some of the insight you need to maneuver in the world of 
international business. Especially through courses like International Management, The 
Political Economy of Corruption, Emerging Markets and Business English I have acquired 
skills and knowledge that will help me maneuver in an International Environment. I have 
already acquired a taste of this, with my job at my former employee National Oilwell Varco 
that were American-owned, located in Norway and traded with and had operations with most 
parts of the world and that later were deeply affected by the 2014 worldwide oil price decline. 
The rise of the Emerging Markets is still something new and unfamiliar for the average 
European and American. Especially the rise of China has been viewed as a threat for Western 
values since they are viewed as an authoritarian, one-party communist state. Experiencing 
new cultures could bring people outside of the “comfort-zone” but it is important to try to see 
that not everything is right “the Western way”. The more knowledge you have about the 
world, there more you realize that you do not understand. Institutional innovations do not 
travel well and needs to be fitted into local beliefs and norms (Rodrik, 2005) . Easy solutions 
on complex problems is not the way to go. It is also important to remove barriers between 
different cultures. It is better to have dialogue with someone you do not necessarily agree 
with, rather than having no contact at all. In that case, you could end up with a segregation 
into “us” and “them” which do not provide a good climate for increased globalization and 
increased contact across borders. 
Innovation 
Innovations is what brings the world further. As discussed in this thesis; If we had not 
experienced the technological progress and innovations which came as a result of the 
industrial revolution, we would not have departed from the Malthusian Epoch’s constant 
struggle for existence. (Galor, 2005), we would not have experienced the increased levels of 
GDP per capita which led to more resources channeled towards human capital, lowered 
fertility and increased life expectancy. This transformation into the living standards and the 
resource abundance experienced in many parts of the world would not have been possible 
without innovation. Future innovations will hopefully bring the world even further. 
As concluded in this thesis, for Emerging Markets to still grow after their economies mature, 
they must evolve into being innovative economies and get a stronger foothold into knowledge 
intensive industries. Knowledge and skills is a pre-existing condition for innovation and 
without education and schooling it is not possible to reach this goal. A demographic 
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advantage may be lost if they fail to educate its people (Goldman Sachs, 2007) and to achieve 
that they need to making education affordable and flexible and building institutions for 
development of human capital (Mudambi, 2015). A good foundation has been laid in some 
countries due to the higher income levels experienced during the last 25 years in most of the 
Emerging Markets and they have could channeled more resources into combating illiteracy 
and giving their population better levels of education. This still need to be prioritized an 
especially providing education to girls and women has been suggested as important for future 
economic growth. 
Responsibility 
Internationalization, innovation and responsibility are topics that in certain perspectives 
overlap each other. The part on responsibility builds further on the topic of 
internationalization. Globalization also brings us closer to cultures and societies with values 
we do not always agree with and customs that could be viewed as unethical from our point of 
view. A Saudi-Arabian man, for example could take it for granted that he can decide when his 
wife can leave the house, or an India man could take it for granted that he can decide who his 
children can marry. When we travel, we could get in dilemmas regarding responsibility and 
ethics. For example, having a servant could be viewed as unethical from a Norwegian point-
of-view, but is a natural part of life in other countries. Should a Norwegian with a well-paid 
job who is working in India then avoid taking servants even if this is something he can afford? 
He can provide a man or woman with a job and an income he would not otherwise have and 
gives him the possibility to provide for himself and maybe his entire family. Is the alternative 
of leaving the man or woman unemployed any better? 
In the world of international business, business gets challenged by responsibility and ethics 
every single day. In many cultures that Norwegian companies operate in, bribes are a natural 
way of “getting things done” and it can be challenging operating without relations to the right 
people. Norwegians could also be trading and operating with companies that are responsible 
for, or being responsible themselves for major pollution, offenses against native inhabitants or 
deforestation of rainforest. Many businesses could have difficulties of seeing responsibility as 
a competitive advantage, but by supporting practices like this, they contribute to undermining 
entire societies. 
Also in international politics, responsibility must compete with business. The Norwegian 
government that earlier had been talking with high voice about their focus on human rights, 
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suddenly wanted to distance themselves from the Norwegian Nobel Committee when they 
awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo a man labelled by the 
People’s Republic of China as a “criminal”(Søhoel, Langset, & Buan, 2010) . The Norwegian 
government also refused to meet the 14th Dalai Lama during his visit to Norway in 2014 to 
not provoke the Chinese government and hurting Norwegian business relations with China, a 
move that was citizen by Amnesty International (Helljesen & Hotvedt, 2014). Responsibility 
in international business and politics could be difficult to maintain when it could affect your 
own interests and many have accused Norway of having a double standard as a nation with 
fronting themselves as being missionaries for peace, but in the same time exports more 
weapon per capita than any other country in the world. 
Is this a responsible way of handling this by the Norwegian government? Likely not. If we 
accept abuse of human rights, we also say that we do not have the same solidarity with people 
living in other countries as we have with our own countrymen. This is a challenge that will be 
even more relevant as we get involved into developing economies. Responsibility is not only 
for your own citizens and humanity should not be divided by boarders. We cannot guarantee 
that all goods imported to Norway or produced for and by Norwegian companies are 
produced in decent conditions. But as citizens and customers we can demand transparency 
and accountability from our politicians and the businesses who cannot operate the way they 
do if they lack support from the people. If the incentives are strong enough for all parts 
involved, we can enhance responsibility in the developing markets as well. 
